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DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE CLIMATE TRANSITION RISKS

MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH*
ABSTRACT
This Article identifies a gap in the securities disclosure regime for
climate change and demonstrates how filling the gap can improve financial disclosures and accelerate climate change mitigation. Private
climate initiatives have proliferated in the last decade. Often led by
advocacy groups, these private initiatives have used naming and
shaming campaigns and other means to induce investors, lenders,
insurers, retail customers, supply chain customers, and employees to
pressure firms to engage in climate change mitigation. Based on an
empirical assessment of the annual reports filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) by Fortune 100 firms and the
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largest firms in several fossil fuel-heavy sectors, this Article concludes that roughly a third of these firms disclose the risks and
opportunities posed by private environmental governance (PEG) initiatives. The assessment also finds, however, that disclosures vary
substantially among similar firms and among similar sectors. The
Article argues that this heterogeneity in disclosure is not surprising
given that the SEC’s 2010 climate guidance and other disclosure
regimes do not call sufficient attention to PEG climate initiatives,
and many lawyers think of environmental risks as synonymous with
governmental regulatory risks. The legal literature on climate transition risk focuses principally on whether regulatory and marketbased risks should be disclosed, but it overlooks the importance of the
material risks posed by PEG climate initiatives. PEG climate initiatives pose a discrete form of climate transition risk for many firms,
and revisions to the SEC guidance and other disclosure regimes to
account for PEG climate initiatives can be adopted more quickly,
produce more complete financial disclosures, and yield greater and
more durable emissions reductions than many other approaches.
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INTRODUCTION
Inconsistencies abound in corporate disclosures of the risks and
opportunities arising from private climate governance actions. In
the most recent annual reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the five largest coal companies disclosed
that investors and lenders are responding to climate change by creating pressure to reduce the use of coal, but none of the largest
electric utilities—the largest users of coal—included similar disclosures.1 Likewise, in its most recent annual report, PepsiCo
discussed the “increased focus, including by governmental and nongovernmental organizations, investors, customers and consumers
on ... environmental sustainability matters, including deforestation, land use, [and] climate impact,” and disclosed the risk posed
by “any failure to achieve our goals with respect to reducing our
impact on the environment or perception (whether or not valid) of
our failure to act responsibly with respect to the environment.”2 A
principal competitor, The Coca-Cola Company, did not include a
similar disclosure.3
Similarly, Alphabet, the parent company of Google, disclosed that
it has made major climate commitments, including matching 100
percent of its electrical consumption with renewable power purchases, but Facebook, which has taken similar steps, did not.4
General Motors described a corporate commitment to procure 100
percent renewable power, but Ford did not.5 American International
1. See infra Part I.B.2.
2. PepsiCo, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30 (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/77476/000007747620000015/pepsico201910-k.htm [https://perma.cc/
R5VV-URF3].
3. See generally Coca-Cola Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000021344/000002134420000006/a2019123110-k.htm [https://
perma.cc/2HPG-BMX8].
4. Compare Alphabet, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001652044/000165204420000008/goog10-k2019.htm [https://
perma.cc/8W8U-B9L9], with Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680120000013/fb-12312019x10k.htm
[https://perma.cc/DZ7P-U96Q].
5. Compare General Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Feb. 5, 2020), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001467858/000146785820000028/gm201910k.htm
[https://perma.cc/5M4G-LL3Y], with Ford Motor Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 5,
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Group, a major insurer, disclosed that “our reputation or corporate
brand could be negatively impacted as a result of changing customer
or societal perceptions of organizations that we either insure or invest in due to their actions (or lack thereof) with respect to climate
change,” but none of the other large insurance companies that file
annual reports with the SEC included a similar disclosure.6 JPMorgan Chase stated that:
Social and environmental activists are increasingly targeting
financial services firms such as JPMorgan Chase with public
criticism for their relationships with clients that are engaged in
certain sensitive industries, including businesses whose products are or are perceived to be harmful to human health, or
whose activities negatively affect or are perceived to negatively
affect the environment, workers’ rights or communities.7

Bank of America also noted the risk of reputational harm arising
from the “perception of [its] environmental, social and governance
practices and disclosures.”8 Wells Fargo, Capital One Financial, and
other large banks are subject to these same types of risks, yet their
annual reports did not disclose them.9
Do these inconsistent disclosures reflect differences in the
financial risks posed to these firms by climate change or differences
in disclosure practices about the growing private pressure on firms
to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions? This Article presents
the results of an empirical study of corporate environmental and
climate disclosures and argues that these are not just anecdotal
2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000037996/000003799620000010/f12312019
10-k.htm [https://perma.cc/G9DP-3Z2U].
6. Compare Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 21 (Feb. 21, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000110465920023889/aig-20191231.htm
[https://perma.cc/VP58-PYK8], with infra Part I.B.2.
7. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 25 (Feb. 25, 2020), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000019617/000001961720000257/corp10k2019.htm
[https://perma.cc/5UUE-W7H5].
8. Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 16 (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000070858/000007085820000011/bac-1231201910xk.htm [https://
perma.cc/RG7X-52TW].
9. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000007297120000217/wfc-12312019x10k.htm [https://
perma.cc/LS9B-UMZD]; Capital One Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://investor.capitalone.com/node/42616/html [https://perma.cc/SJ5U-6APY].

1700

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1695

differences or differences in the financial condition of the firms.
Instead, they reflect limitations in the securities disclosure regulatory regime and limitations in the conceptual model of governance
that shapes the thinking of the lawyers, accountants, business
managers, and policymakers who manage the disclosure process.
Based on this analysis, the Article proposes viable changes to the
securities disclosure regime to improve the information available to
investors and accelerate climate change mitigation.
A vigorous academic and policy debate is underway about the disclosure of climate risks. On one track, the debate concerns whether
climate risks merit disclosure by publicly traded firms even if they
are not material as that term is interpreted by the SEC and courts.
Scholars such as Cynthia Williams10 and Jill Fisch,11 along with
many others,12 have argued that disclosure of environmental issues
merits a departure from the focus on reporting of material financial
risks that has been dominant for ninety years.13 I share this view.
10. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1201-02, 1299 (1999) (arguing for a new standard for environmental and other social issues).
11. See Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923,
950-51 (2019) (arguing that materiality is a principles-based requirement that does not
stabilize the types of disclosures from companies facing climate risks and proposing new SEC
requirements to address sustainability disclosure and analysis).
12. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty & Quentin Karpilow, Harnessing Investor Interest in Sustainability: The Next Frontier in Environmental Information Regulation, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL.
625, 690 (2019) (suggesting a mandatory environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting requirement); Virginia Harper Ho & Stephen Kim Park, ESG Disclosure in Comparative
Perspective: Optimizing Private Ordering in Public Reporting, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 249, 256
(2019) (noting the value of hybrid public-private ESG disclosure); Melissa K. Scanlan, Climate
Risk Is Investment Risk, 36 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 1, 15 (2021); Thomas Clarke, The Widening
Scope of Directors’ Duties: The Increasing Impact of Corporate Social and Environmental
Responsibility, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 531, 531 (2016) (proposing expansion of directors’ duties); Adam Sulkowski & Sandra Waddock, Beyond Sustainability Reporting: Integrated
Reporting Is Practiced, Required, and More Would Be Better, 10 U. ST. THOMAS. L.J. 1060,
1061 (2013) (“Thousands of companies around the world, including 95 percent of the Global
Fortune 250, voluntarily report on their environmental, societal, and economic impacts.”). But
see Margaret E. Peloso, An Approach for Investors, Companies, ENV’T F., Nov./Dec. 2020, at
27, 27 (recommending a focus on firm resilience); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff,
Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing
by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 386 (2020) (arguing trust fiduciary duty requirements
allow trustees to account for ESG issues only in limited circumstances).
13. Cf. Gary Gensler, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement Before the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/gens
ler-statement-financial-stability-oversight-council-102121 [https://perma.cc/8VS4-7R8K].
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Climate change is one of the greatest threats to modern society,14 so
if disclosure of climate information will drive carbon emissions reductions, even if additional disclosure is somewhat costly and causes
some muddying of the security regulatory regime’s focus on financial
materiality,15 a departure is warranted. Even with pressure from
the Biden administration and more supportive appointments to federal agencies and commissions, however, efforts to depart from the
focus on financial materiality through changes to statutes, regulations, policies, and litigation will face high hurdles.16
On a different track, the climate disclosure debate focuses not on
whether the financial materiality standard should be modified or
supplemented, but whether companies are failing to disclose two
types of climate risks even if they are material to a reasonable investor.17 The first is often called physical risk, which is the risk that
climate change itself—rising sea levels, increased severity of storms,
heat waves, and forest fires, and the human responses to them such
as crop failures, migration, and social unrest—will have material
adverse financial effects.18 The second is often called transition risk,
the risk that climate mitigation measures will adversely affect a
firm’s financial position;19 although given the SEC’s focus on and the
risks posed by government regulation and traditional forms of
market risk by the SEC and other government entities, transition
risk might more accurately be called regulatory or market risk. In
2010, the SEC issued guidance on disclosure of climate change risks
14. Press Release, Security Council, Climate Change ‘Biggest Threat Modern Humans
Have Ever Faced’, World-Renowned Naturalist Tells Security Council, Calls for Greater Global Cooperation, U.N. Press Release SC/14445 (Feb. 23, 2021).
15. See ALEXANDRA THORNTON & TYLER GELLASCH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE SEC HAS
BROAD AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE CLIMATE AND OTHER ESG DISCLOSURES 1, 3, 7, 15 (2021)
(discussing backlash to the SEC’s recent request for comments on “enhanced climate-related
and ‘human capital management’ disclosures”).
16. See generally id.
17. See Fisch, supra note 11, at 955-56.
18. JONATHAN WOETZEL, DICKON PINNER, HAMID SAMANDARI, HAUKE ENGEL, MEKALA
KRISHNAN, BRODIE BOLAND & CARTER POWIS, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., CLIMATE RISK AND
RESPONSE: PHYSICAL HAZARDS AND SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS viii, 10, 15, 47 (2020). For
instance, this report concluded that by the 2040s in some parts of the U.S. Southeast, the
likelihood of a once-in-a-century hurricane is likely to double and that it may triple in certain
areas in Southeast Asia. Id. at 10.
19. Kezia Farnham, What Is Transition Risk and How Can Today’s Organizations Tackle
It?, DILIGENT (July 7, 2021), https://www.diligent.com/insights/esg/transition-risk/ [https://
perma.cc/77CB-9TN6].
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(the “2010 Guidance”), which follows the traditional thinking on
this issue: it focuses on the material effects of physical and transition risks, the two conventional conceptions of climate change
risk.20 More recently, leading scholars,21 the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),22 the Federal Reserve,23 and
major global private and public-private hybrid initiatives such as
the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (TCFD)24
and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB),25 have
also focused principally on the development of standards and
methods to increase the disclosure of these two types of climate
risks.
20. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg.
6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010) [hereinafter SEC 2010 Guidance].
21. See, e.g., Esty & Karpillow, supra note 12, at 690 (discussing climate risk in the
context of a proposal for mandatory disclosure); Lisa Benjamin, The Road to Paris Runs
Through Delaware: Climate Litigation and Directors’ Duties, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 313, 381 (discussing directors’ duties regarding climate issues); Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack,
Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 51, 53-54
(2012) (discussing firms’ motivations for engaging in socially responsible activities).
22. CLIMATE-RELATED MARKET RISK SUBCOMM., U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM., MANAGING CLIMATE RISK IN THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM 2 [hereinafter CFTC Report],
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/9-9-20%20Report%20of%20the%20Subcom
mittee%20on%20Climate-Related%20Market%20Risk%20-%20Managing%20Climate%20
Risk%20in%20the%20U.S.%20Financial%20System%20for%20posting.pdf [https://perma.
cc/TZD7-JE5Z] (“A world wracked by frequent and devastating shocks from climate change
cannot sustain the fundamental conditions supporting our financial system.”); see also Market
Risk Advisory Committee, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM., https://www.cftc.gov/
About/AdvisoryCommittees/MRAC [https://perma.cc/Y6XK-8KFN].
23. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 58 (Nov.
2020) [hereinafter Federal Reserve Report], https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/
financial-stability-report-20201109.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF5G-3ZWE] (“Opacity of exposures
and heterogeneous beliefs of market participants about exposures to climate risks can lead
to mispricing of assets and the risk of downward price shocks.”). The Financial Stability Oversight Council, a Treasury Department-led body created in the wake of the 2008 crisis, has
incorporated climate risks into its annual report and has suggested that the Federal Reserve
and other major financial regulators join international coalitions that focus on climate
threats. See generally id.; About FSOC, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.
gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-service/fsoc/about-fsoc
[https://perma.cc/66S9-QURB].
24. See FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 41 (2017) [hereinafter TCFD 2017 Report], https://assets.bbhub.io/
company/sites/60/2020/10/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf [https://perma.cc/69G5B9AX].
25. See SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 2-3 (2017)
[hereinafter SASB 2017 Framework], https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/
SASB_Conceptual-Framework_WATERMARK.pdf [https://perma.cc/E75E-K2TX].
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This Article takes a different approach. It argues that the two
current tracks pursued by scholars, policymakers, and advocates,
which focus principally on relaxing or bypassing the materiality
standard, or on better identifying physical climate risk and regulatory or market transition climate risk, are important but overlook a more viable opportunity: disclosure of the transition risks
posed by the newly emerging phenomenon of private environmental
governance (PEG).26 For instance, when a company commits to reducing the carbon emissions from its supply chain and imposes
reduction targets in supply chain contracts, high-carbon suppliers
can lose important markets for their products. This is a climate
transition risk, but it is not a government regulatory risk, and it is
not simply a market risk. It is a risk that emerges because the buying company is playing a private regulatory role with its suppliers
even if governments are not requiring it to do so. PEG initiatives
take many forms, but they all share the common feature of nongovernmental actors (including corporations, investors, lenders,
insurers, advocacy groups, and other private sector actors) performing traditionally governmental functions such as reducing negative
externalities (in this case carbon emissions) or managing common
pool resources or public goods (in this case, the ability of the atmosphere to maintain a stable climate).27 PEG climate initiatives
can induce firms to reduce carbon emissions even absent government climate mitigation requirements, and in some cases they overcome government opposition to climate mitigation.28 They present
a discrete new type of transition risk that does not fit neatly into
physical, regulatory, or market risks and that has grown substantially since the development of the 2010 Guidance.29 The emerging
26. See infra Part I.A.
27. See, e.g., Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN.
L. REV. 137, 140-41 (2019); Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private
Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 1, 4, 8-9 (2015); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 146 (2013); Sarah C.
Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections, 126
YALE L.J. 262, 286 (2016) (framing settlement agreements in shareholder proposals as a mechanism for private ordering in campaign finance and environmental proposals).
28. See Vandenbergh, supra note 27, at 136-38.
29. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. As Alan Palmiter has noted, PEG activities
in the form of ESG actions by corporations reached an inflection point in roughly 2012, and
the activity since then has been remarkable. Alan R. Palmiter, Capitalism, Heal Thyself 4
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importance of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues
and growth in PEG climate initiatives has also occurred largely
under the radar screen of much of the legal scholarship on climate
risk disclosure.30
As the examples at the outset suggest, a wide range of PEG climate initiatives pose potentially material transition risks, including
advocacy group pressure on firms to disclose or reduce emissions,31
naming and shaming campaigns directed at managers, employees,
or retail customers,32 and divestiture or investor engagement campaigns directed at institutional investment firms, lenders, and insurers.33 PEG climate transition risks also arise from the knock-on
effects of this direct pressure, including adoption of public commitments by corporations, investment firms and pension funds, lenders,
and insurers.34 Perhaps most importantly, PEG climate transition
risks also include the risks that arise from the transfer of this emissions reduction pressure to borrowers, equity issuers, suppliers, and
utilities.35 For instance, Walmart has worked with several environmental advocacy groups to develop Project Gigaton, through which
Walmart has committed to reducing the GHG emissions from its
suppliers by a billion tons by 2030, an amount roughly equal to the
(Nov. 25, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstrct_
id=3940395 (“Something happened in about 2012, and there’s no indication it’s going to end
soon. In fact, there’s every reason to believe that nearly all [assets under management] globally will soon have some form of ESG flavor—whether ESG-incorporated, ESG-focused, ESGactivist, or ESG-impact investing. At current exponential growth rates, this should happen
in 2022, latest 2023. And then the ESG flavors will only become more and more intense.”).
30. See Louis G. Leonard III, Under the Radar: A Coherent System of Climate Governance,
Driven by Business, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10546, 10546-47, 10568 (2020) (providing analysis by former head of energy and climate programs from World Wildlife Fund regarding importance of
PEG climate initiatives and noting these initiatives present financial risks and opportunities);
David G. Victor, Faced with Government Inaction, Private Firms Emerge as Major Players in
Climate Change Mitigation, SCI. (Dec. 18, 2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20171222
153710/http://blogs.sciencemag.org/books/2017/12/18/beyond-politics/ [https://perma.cc/C7KTF9CJ] (noting the growing importance of private sector action regarding climate change).
31. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
32. See Leonard, supra note 30, at 10552-55.
33. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J.
ENV’T L. 217, 253, 264-66 (2015).
34. Haley Wiebel, Kevin Moss & Emily Neagle, From Pledges to Action: What’s Next for
COP26 Corporate Commitments, WORLD RES. INST. (Nov. 22, 2021), https://www.wri.org/in
sights/pledges-action-whats-next-cop26-corporate-commitments [https://perma.cc/Z8WW57XZ].
35. See Leonard, supra note 30, at 10552-55.
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annual emissions of Germany or Japan.36 Any major supplier selling
to Walmart can thus expect GHG reduction pressure not just from
governments, but from Walmart.37
These private initiatives are motivated by a complex set of
drivers: financial gains from efficiency; employee norms; corporate
and retail customer pressure; reputation or brand concerns; investor, lender, and insurer pressure; and others.38 Anticipation of
future government regulatory pressure plays an important role in
some cases, but it cannot explain the growth of PEG climate initiatives that occurred during the Trump administration and in
countries and states where governments have resisted climate
change mitigation.39 An example is the We Are Still In initiative,
which was organized by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and other
advocacy groups and included not only cities and states, but also
hundreds of companies, all committing to support the goals of the
Paris Agreement after the Trump administration announced its
intention to withdraw.40 Although the focus of the academic literature, disclosure regimes, and this Article is on the adverse effects
of climate change, PEG climate initiatives can also create opportunities that may be just as important to a reasonable investor as the
risks. For instance, although a supply chain contracting requirement for low-GHG goods may disadvantage some suppliers, it may
advantage others.41

36. See Project Gigaton, WALMART SUSTAINABILITY HUB, https://www.walmartsustain
abilityhub.com/project-gigaton [https://perma.cc/W55P-D4C7]; Jim Witkin, Inside Walmart’s
Lofty Project Gigaton: Supply Chain Engagement for Cutting Emissions, TRIPLE PUNDIT (May
11, 2018), https://www.triplepundit.com/story/2018/inside-walmarts-lofty-project-gigaton-sup
ply-chain-engagement-cutting-emissions/12371 [https://perma.cc/9ZDH-3T5K].
37. See Project Gigaton, supra note 36.
38. See generally MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS:
THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2017); Kitzmueller & Shimshack,
supra note 21, at 62-70.
39. See Vandenbergh, supra note 27, at 131-32, 136-37.
40. See Leonard, supra note 30, at 10559.
41. See Edward Klump, Kristi E. Swartz & Arianna Skibell, CEOs Outline 3 Trends Hitting Electricity, GOVERNORS’ WIND & SOLAR ENERGY COAL. (Nov. 16, 2020), https://governors
windenergycoalition.org/ceos-outline-3-trends-hitting-electricity/ [https://perma.cc/M66L-33
XJ] (quoting John Ketchum, CEO of the competitive wholesale unit NextEra, for the proposition that “pressure that formally nontraditional buyers of renewables are facing from their
investor base has really expanded the opportunity for us”).
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To assess the status of firm disclosure of PEG climate transition
risks, this Article reports on an examination of the most recent
annual reports (often referred to as “10-Ks”) of the Fortune 100 companies, plus the five largest coal companies (by market share in
production), the five largest petroleum refining companies (by revenue), and the five largest utility companies (also by revenue).42 The
results indicate that many firms recognize the material risks posed
by PEG climate initiatives: more than one-third of the Fortune 100
firms disclosed PEG climate transition risks when discussing matters that may be material to a reasonable investor.43
The disclosures discussed at the outset provide examples, such as
the JPMorgan Chase statement that “[s]ocial and environmental
activists are increasingly targeting financial services firms” based
on the environmental effects of their lending practices.44 Not surprisingly, these disclosures are most common among fossil fuelheavy industries. A major coal company disclosed PEG climate
transition risks by noting the threat posed by “unfavorable lending
policies by lending institutions and divestment efforts affecting the
investment community.”45 Although the coal firm’s filing did not
specify the types of lender policies or divestment efforts that posed
material risks, as the JPMorgan disclosure suggests some lenders
have responded to advocacy group pressure by adopting policies that
disfavor lending to fossil-fuel heavy projects and companies.46 Other
private initiatives have pressured investors to divest from fossil
fuel-heavy stocks or have encouraged investors to pressure companies to transition away from reliance on coal and other fossil
fuels.47
This Article demonstrates that the disclosure of PEG climate
transition risks varies substantially among firms and rarely fully
explores the extent of the financial risk and opportunity presented

42. See infra Part I.B.1.
43. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, https://vanderbilt.app.box.com/
s/5s846eodlwwvbe4zk3py7qgln379rtt9 [https://perma.cc/PUZ8-UC4K].
44. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 7, at 25.
45. All. Res. Partners, L.P., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 34 (Feb. 20, 2020), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1086600/000155837020001103/arlp-20191231x10kbc
62ed.htm [https://perma.cc/TT4E-PY63].
46. See infra Part I.A.
47. See infra Part I.A.
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by PEG climate initiatives. Many annual reports of similarly situated firms say nothing about the transition risks arising from PEG
climate initiatives.48 An example of a transition risk disclosure that
focused almost exclusively on traditional government regulatory
risks was filed by Marathon Petroleum Corporation, which stated
that “[m]eeting the requirements of evolving environmental or other
laws or regulations may reduce our refining and marketing margin
and may result in substantial capital expenditures and operating
costs that could materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows.”49 In addition,
disclosure in annual reports is not only uneven among the firms in
the Fortune 100: it is uneven among firms within the same sector
and between sectors.50 Bank of America disclosed the risks presented by reputational harm from the “perception of [its] environmental, social and governance practices and disclosures,” yet Wells
Fargo and Capital One Financial are subject to these types of risks,
but did not disclose them.51
Although the heterogeneity in disclosures may simply be the
product of differences in firm economics (for example, differences in
materiality thresholds), differing disclosure practices provide a more
plausible answer. The 2010 Guidance, other disclosure regimes, and
the training of many public- and private-sector lawyers, accountants, business managers, and policymakers who manage disclosure
all focus on the physical and transition risk buckets for climate
change and appear to treat transition risks as largely synonymous
with government regulatory risks or traditional market risks.52
Although the 2010 Guidance addresses transition risks, its specific
48. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
49. Marathon Petroleum Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 32 (Feb. 28, 2020), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001510295/000151029520000006/mpc-20191231x10k.htm
[https://perma.cc/G9XK-Y7G3].
50. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
51. Compare Bank of Am. Corp., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 8, at 16, with Wells Fargo
& Co., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 9, and Capital One Fin. Corp., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note
9.
52. See infra Part II. For a recent discussion of the importance of climate risk disclosures,
compare Hana Vizcarra, The Uncertainty Principles, ENV’T F., Nov./Dec. 2020, at 23, 26 (contrasting resistance to disclosure by the SEC and Department of Labor Employee Benefits
Security Administration with the more favorable response by the CFTC and Federal Reserve),
with Peloso, supra note 12, at 27 (advocating use of climate scenario analysis as “a tool to
enhance corporate resilience” rather than to motivate firms to reduce GHG emissions).
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provisions focus on risks arising from new legislation or regulations,53 but the material financial effects that arise from PEG initiatives are not government regulatory risks because they arise from
private, not government, action. The 2010 Guidance also notes the
importance of risks arising from the indirect consequences of regulation or business trends, but PEG initiatives are not simply the
consequence of standard business trends, and the 2010 Guidance
does not explicitly call attention to PEG climate risks or provide examples of the types of risks posed by PEG climate initiatives.54
It is not surprising that the 2010 Guidance overlooks the transition risks posed by PEG climate initiatives: the SEC drafted the
guidance before the rapid growth in PEG climate initiatives over the
last decade.55 Important new reports on climate-related risks issued
in 2020 by the CFTC and the Federal Reserve, however, follow a
similar pattern.56 A 2021 model SEC information request letter
signals the SEC’s growing awareness of PEG climate initiatives and
the growth of ESG investing but still frames these risks as a form
of market risk rather than recognizing that they are a discrete, hybrid form of regulatory and market risk that is driven by private
sector actors and cannot be easily predicted or understood by simply
examining traditional market forces.57 Recent public-private hybrid
disclosure efforts such as TCFD and SASB recognize the importance
of some of the drivers of PEG climate initiatives, such as reputation
and consumer preferences for low-carbon goods, but they provide
only limited instructions for identifying and disclosing these risks,
and they could be far more specific in calling out the potential material financial effects of a firm subject to or participating in a PEG
climate initiative.58

53. See SEC 2010 Guidance, supra note 20, at 6,291, 6,296-97.
54. See id. at 6,296.
55. See Palmiter, supra note 29, at 4.
56. See generally CFTC Report, supra note 22; Federal Reserve Report, supra note 23.
57. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Corp. Fin., Sample Letter to Companies Regarding
Climate Change Disclosures (Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/sample-letter-cli
mate-change-disclosures [https://perma.cc/Z32Q-Z42J].
58. See TCFD 2017 Report, supra note 24, at 41; SASB 2017 Framework, supra note 25,
at 2-3. For a discussion of the emerging importance of private governance initiatives outside
of the environmental protection area, see Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms
as Public Enforcers, 106 VA. L. REV. 467 (2020).
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The failure of policymakers to identify and firms to consistently
disclose PEG climate transition risks may reflect the difficulty
scholars, professionals, and policy advocates face when confronting
a new form of governance risk. Scholars are often tenacious in
holding onto mental models,59 and unless they are recent graduates,
the lawyers, accountants, business managers, and policymakers
driving and implementing securities disclosure efforts were trained
to think of the regulatory universe as including two parties (to paraphrase the famous introduction to Law & Order): the government
regulators and the private sector actors who are the targets of
regulation.60 When a new phenomenon arises that does not fit neatly
into this dyadic view of the world, the regulatory community—the
regulators and the regulated companies—may respond slowly. For
many new phenomena, a slow response by the disclosure regulatory
regime may be adequate and perhaps even advisable.61 For climate
change, however, prompt, major carbon emissions reductions are

59. See, e.g., Richard Conniff, When Continental Drift Was Considered Pseudoscience,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (June 2012), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/when-con
tinental-drift-was-considered-pseudoscience-90353214/ [https://perma.cc/H5NX-RFZQ]. For
a more recent example relevant to climate science, see JAMES LAWRENCE POWELL, DEADLY
VOYAGER: THE ANCIENT COMET STRIKE THAT CHANGED EARTH AND HUMAN HISTORY xiii-xiv
(2020) (discussing reluctance to accept a new explanatory model of the causes of the Younger
Dryas event, which produced a several hundred-year global cooling event).
60. Law & Order opens with the statement that “[i]n the criminal justice system, the
people are represented by two separate yet equally important groups: the police who
investigate crime, and the district attorneys who prosecute the offenders. These are their
stories.” See Law & Order: Prescription for Death (NBC television broadcast Sept. 13, 1990).
Although questions regarding disclosure of PEG climate risks have not yet been a focus of
federal or state courts, it is fair to assume that the same difficulty of recognizing the
implications of this new form of governance will occur among judges as well. See Ramirez v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 839, 844, 859 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (granting motion to
dismiss shareholder suit); People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018, 2019 WL 6795771
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 10, 2019) (addressing claim that Exxon Mobil misled investors on impact
of future climate policies). For a discussion of People v. Exxon Mobil, see Han Li, Climate
Change Isn’t Material?: How People of the State of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corporation
Highlights the Need for Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Emission Disclosures, MINN. L. REV.
DENOVO (2020), https://minnesotalawreview.org/2020/04/26/climate-change-isnt-materialhow-people-of-the-state-of-new-york-v-exxon-mobil-corporation-highlights-the-need-for-man
datory-greenhouse-gas-emission-disclosures/ [https://perma.cc/DSW7-PNXJ].
61. See generally Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959); Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 517 (1979).
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necessary to avoid locking in long-term climatic and social harms,
and governments have been slow to respond.62
This Article identifies several viable steps that can be taken immediately to recognize and disclose PEG climate transition risks.63
The SEC can update the 2010 Guidance to indicate explicitly that
firms should assess and disclose the transition risks arising from
PEG climate initiatives, and the CFTC and Federal Reserve can
take similar steps. Public-private and private disclosure regimes,
such as those developed by the TCFD and SASB, can clarify their
disclosure language to note the importance of PEG initiatives more
explicitly and can provide more detailed guidelines on how these
risks should be assessed and disclosed. Over the longer term, the
training of scholars, lawyers, accountants, business managers, and
policymakers can better prepare the principal actors in the securities regulatory regime to recognize, assess, and disclose these risks.
In turn, increased disclosure of the transition risks posed by PEG
climate initiatives can accelerate pressure for climate change mitigation activities by providing additional information to investors,
corporate directors, corporate managers, employees, retail and corporate customers, advocates, philanthropists, and regulators about
the effects of PEG climate initiatives. An extensive literature on
disclosure of toxic emissions, anecdotal evidence of the effects of
carbon disclosure on firm carbon emissions, and the theoretical
foundations of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 33 Act)64 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 34 Act)65 suggest that
disclosure drives corporate action.66 Disclosure of PEG climate
62. Stephanie Ebbs, Scientists: Time Running Short Before Climate Change Effects Are
“Irreversible,” ABC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2018, 1:17 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/
united-nations-report-details-looming-climate-crisis/story?id=58354235 [https://perma.cc/
8HAQ-X3PQ].
63. For a discussion of viable steps the new Biden administration can take to promote
PEG climate initiatives, see Lou Leonard, Michael Vandenbergh & Jonathan Gilligan, The
Road Back to Paris Runs Through Pittsburgh, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 21, 2020, 6:15
AM), https://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2020/12/21/Lou-Leonard-Michael-Vanden
bergh-and-Jonathan-Gilligan-The-road-back-to-Paris-runs-through-Pittsburgh/stories/2020
12210008 [https://perma.cc/M8NL-785R].
64. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g(c), 77k.
65. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d(a)-(b).
66. See generally Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect
of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENV’T ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997)
(reporting on effects of TRI emissions on share value). For a discussion of the role of
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transition risks can leverage existing market and social pressures
on firms to reduce carbon emissions, demonstrate the influence of
existing PEG initiatives, and encourage the development of new
PEG initiatives. Increased disclosure can also inform advocacy
groups and philanthropists of the effects of their initiatives, identify
areas for expansion of existing initiatives or creation of new ones,
and induce stakeholders to increase support for the most effective
efforts and organizations. Given the deep partisan political divide
in the United States, an approach that leverages private sector action may occur more quickly than other regulatory or statutory
actions. Private sector action may yield carbon emissions reductions
equal to major regulatory initiatives, and, by locking in private
sector spending and infrastructure, may be more durable than many
other types of government regulatory actions.
I. DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE CLIMATE GOVERNANCE RISKS
Part I identifies the types of PEG climate initiatives and explores
why these initiatives pose a discrete form of transition risk that is
often worthy of disclosure by publicly traded firms. This Part then
presents the results of a review of the securities disclosures of the
Fortune 100 firms and the five largest firms in the coal, utility, and
petroleum refining sectors to examine the extent to which firms are
reporting the risks arising from PEG climate initiatives.
A. Types and Effects of PEG Climate Initiatives
As discussed above, for the purposes of this Article, PEG occurs
when private sector actors perform the roles traditionally assigned
to governments regarding environmental law and policy, such as reducing negative externalities and managing common pool resources
and public goods.67 Although the name assigned to the phenomenon
information in regulating environmental and other risks, see Daniel C. Esty, Environmental
Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 119-21 (2004), and Cass R. Sunstein,
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
613, 614 (1999).
67. See Sarah E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance,
in DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 253-67 (LeRoy C. Paddock et al. eds., 2016);
Vandenbergh, supra note 27, at 146 (discussing public functions of private governance).
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differs across disciplines, a growing literature explores the growth,
effects, scope, and risks arising from private governance, private ordering, or private authority. PEG initiatives have spawned an active
literature in law,68 political science,69 sociology,70 economics,71 psychology,72 and other fields.73 The growth of PEG has occurred across
68. See, e.g., JASON J. CZARNEZKI, GREEN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR
PROMOTING ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION 71
(2019); Daniel A. Farber, Going Private: Climate Action by Businesses and Individuals, VAND.
L. REV. EN BANC 197 (2018) (reviewing MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN,
BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2017)); Dan
Farber, Going Private, LEGAL PLANET BLOG (Mar. 12, 2018), http://legal-planet.org/2018/03/12/
going-private/ [https://perma.cc/JM7P-M94Z]; Leonard, supra note 30, at 10559; Light, supra
note 27; Light & Orts, supra note 27; TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN
THE AGE OF INDUSTRIAL FOOD (2013); LeRoy Paddock & Natasha Rao, Green Supply Chain
Management: A Perspective on Best Practices in GSCM Design, 71 ARK. L. REV. 487 (2018);
Vandenbergh, supra note 27; Vandenbergh & Gilligan, supra note 33; see also Joshua Ulan
Galperin, Trust Me, I’m a Pragmatist: A Partially Pragmatic Critique of Pragmatic Activism,
42 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 425, 494 (2017) (noting that PEG “can weaken the entire endeavor” of
public environmental governance); Joshua Ulan Galperin, Board Rooms and Jail Cells:
Assessing NGO Approaches to Private Environmental Governance, 71 ARK. L. REV. 403 (2018)
[hereinafter Galperin, Board Rooms and Jail Cells] (identifying risks arising from PEG climate initiatives); Joshua Ulan Galperin, Environmental Governance at the Edge of Democracy, 39 VA. ENV’T L.J. 70 (2021) (exploring relationship of private and public environmental
governance).
69. See, e.g., Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Complex Global Governance and
Domestic Policies: Four Pathways of Influence, 88 INT’L AFFS. 585 (2012); JESSICA F. GREEN,
RETHINKING PRIVATE AUTHORITY: AGENTS AND ENTREPRENEURS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE (2014); Zdravka Tzankova, Interactions Between Private and Public Resource
Governance: Key Insights from the Fisheries Case, 6 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1 (2014).
70. See, e.g., Tim Bartley, Transnational Corporations and Global Governance, 44 ANN.
REV. SOCIO. 145 (2018); Paul C. Stern & Thomas Dietz, A Broader Social Science Research
Agenda on Sustainability: Nongovernmental Influences on Climate Footprints, 60 ENERGY
RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 1 (2020).
71. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Potential Role of Carbon
Labeling in a Green Economy, 34 ENERGY ECON. S53-S63 (2012); Thomas P. Lyon & John W.
Maxwell, Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure Under Threat of Audit, 20 J. ECON.
& MGMT. STRATEGY 3 (2011).
72. See, e.g., Heather Barnes Truelove, Amanda R. Carrico, Elke U. Weber, Kaitlin Toner
Raimi & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Positive and Negative Spillover of Pro-Environmental Behavior: An Integrative Review and Theoretical Framework, GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE, Nov. 2014,
at 127, 129-38 (examining spillover effects of public and private pro-environmental behavioral
interventions); Ash Gillis, Michael Vandenbergh, Kaitlin Raimi, Alex Maki & Ken Wallston,
Convincing Conservatives: Private Sector Action Can Bolster Support for Change Mitigation
in the United States, 73 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 1 (2021) (reporting on empirical study of
the effects of private climate governance initiatives on support for climate mitigation among
moderates and conservatives).
73. See, e.g., Katerina Peterkova Mitkidis, Sustainability Clauses in International Supply
Chain Contracts: Regulation, Enforceability and Effects of Ethical Requirements, NORDIC J.
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many of the subject matter areas addressed by environmental
lawyers, including not only climate change, but also toxics, global
fisheries, forestry, organic food, food safety, trade, and others.74 PEG
initiatives also utilize many of the same instrument types as are
deployed in public environmental governance regimes, including
disclosure, prescriptive standards, market leveraging, and others.75
PEG initiatives that focus on climate change mitigation have
grown substantially since the SEC issued the 2010 Guidance. These
initiatives involve joint actions by corporations and advocacy
groups, unilateral corporate actions such as commitments to procure
renewable power, and corporate-corporate interactions such as large
firms’ imposition of climate mitigation obligations on their suppliers.76 Climate change advocacy has involved dark green groups such
as Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, and the Rainforest Action Network,
which often focus on naming and shaming campaigns, and bright
green groups such as Ceres, the Environmental Defense Fund, the
Natural Resources Defense Council, the World Resources Institute,
and the World Wildlife Fund, which engage in naming and shaming
but often also focus on collaborative activities.77
1. Drivers
Corporate participation in private governance initiatives is motivated by a complex set of drivers, including the prospect of financial gains from efficiency or new business opportunities and
avoidance of reputation or brand risks, response to employee and
manager norms, and response to retail customer pressure.78 Political
COM. L. 1 (2014) (examining environmental supply chain contracting in Europe).
74. See, e.g., Liliana B. Andonova, Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Transnational
Climate Governance, GLOB. ENV’T POL., May 2009, at 52; Steven Bernstein & Matthew
Hoffmann, The Politics of Decarbonization and the Catalytic Impact of Subnational Climate
Experiments, 51 POL’Y SCIS. 189 (2018); Jessica F. Green, The Strength of Weakness: PseudoClubs in the Climate Regime, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE 41 (2017); Light & Vandenbergh, supra
note 67.
75. See generally Light & Orts, supra note 27.
76. See Leonard, supra note 30, at 10553, 10556, 10559, 10561.
77. See Andrew J. Hoffman, Shades of Green, 7 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 40, 40-49
(2009).
78. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Drivers of Corporate Climate Mitigation, ENV’T F.,
Jan.-Feb. 2018, at 29.
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scientists have argued that these types of drivers result in a firm
needing a social license as well as a legal license to operate.79 In
turn, these drivers induce firms to regulate other firms through
corporate supply chain, investor, lender, and insurer pressure and,
in some cases, legally binding requirements such as supply chain
contract provisions.80 Louis Leonard, the former head of energy and
climate programs for the World Wildlife Fund,81 played a key role in
organizing several leading PEG climate initiatives over the last decade, including We Are Still In, the Renewable Energy Buyers Alliance (REBA), and others.82 Leonard groups the drivers of corporate
participation in PEG climate initiatives into five categories:
• The business case for action, which includes the financial
pressure resulting from growing recognition of climate risks,
the improvement of returns on investment due to falling costs
of climate solutions, and the increased likelihood of public
policy responses to climate change;
• public pressure, which includes boycotts, naming and shaming campaigns, and advocacy organization pressure;
• evolving norms, which include the growing concern about
climate change from industry leaders and employees, making
it outside of the norm for companies in many sectors to avoid
these concerns;
• business-to-business pressure, which includes the incorporation of climate issues in supply chain contracts and procurement policies; and
79. See Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307,
308-10 (2004).
80. Legal scholar Lisa Benjamin notes that while companies have not been adequately
characterizing their climate risk or preparing for its impact, investors are increasing the
pressure to be transparent about emissions and sustainability. Benjamin, supra note 21, at
351-52.
81. Lou Leonard, B.C. L. SCH. MAG. (2021), https://lawmagazine.bc.edu/class_note/louleonard/ [https://perma.cc/H28P-NX3T].
82. For example, the “We Are Still In” movement involved corporations, cities, states, and
other organizations expressing an intent to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement even absent
participation by the U.S. government during the Trump administration. See Leonard, supra
note 30, at 10559.
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• financial system pressure, which arises as investors, lenders,
and insurers recognize climate-related risks and become
hesitant to do business with companies that have unsustainable climate practices.83

These drivers help explain the extensive growth of PEG climate
initiatives, but an important feature of the emerging system is that
it exhibits a certain amount of circularity regarding the motivations
for corporate climate actions.84 This circularity can lead to additional momentum and cascades of action, although it makes developing a model of PEG climate actions difficult.85
For instance, corporate climate commitments may occur initially
because of the business case, public pressure, and evolving norms.86
Cascades may then occur as additional firms make climate commitments, and the growing number of firms announcing commitments
strengthens the business case, public pressure, and the perceived
norms among managers and employees, and these motivations then
induce firms to pressure others via business-to-business (B-to-B)
and financial system pressure.87 In turn, the B-to-B and financial
system pressure can further increase the business case for climate
action, embolden advocates who conduct public pressure campaigns,
and bolster evolving norms among employees and customers.88
To assess the extent to which PEG climate initiatives present
material transition risks that are distinct from government reglatory transition risks, it is important to understand the types of
initiatives that have emerged since the SEC issued the 2010 Guidance. First, many initiatives create or channel external advocacy
83. See id. at 10552-55. The five categories of PEG climate initiatives identified by Lou
Leonard are: (1) the business case for action; (2) business-to-business pressure; (3) public
pressure; (4) financial system pressure; and (5) evolving norms. See id. Private financial
rating firms also are increasingly playing a private governance role regarding climate change
mitigation. See Kevin Fagan & Blair Coulson, Moody’s Including Four Twenty Seven Climate
Risk Data into Research and Ratings on US CMBS and CRE CLOs, MOODY’S (Aug. 11, 2020),
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-including-Four-Twenty-Seven-climate-risk-datainto-research-PBS_1241276 [https://perma.cc/8NZV-YJKC].
84. See Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 71, at S55.
85. See id.
86. See Leonard, supra note 30, at 10552-55.
87. See id. For an example regarding social norms, see Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms
and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
88. See Leonard, supra note 30, at 10552-55.
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group or public pressure on firms to make and implement climate
commitments using naming and shaming or other similar strategies.89 The targets of naming and shaming campaigns are often
firms with retail customers who focus on climate issues or firms
that otherwise may be particularly concerned about brand or reputation issues.90
Second, other disclosure-based initiatives do not engage in
naming and shaming but focus on using more neutral actions to
induce firms to reduce GHG emissions.91 For instance, CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) uses the influence of investors
with roughly 100 trillion dollars in assets under management to
induce corporations to disclose and reduce their GHG emissions.92
The CDP effort is more focused on consistent, accurate reporting of
GHG emissions than naming and shaming.93 Similarly, the Global
Reporting Initiative focuses on reporting GHG and other emissions
without engaging in naming and shaming.94
Third, other initiatives focus on generating and harnessing employee pressure for employer corporate action, such as highly publicized actions by employees at Amazon, Facebook, and Google.95 An
executive at a technology firm has indicated that employee recruitment and retention are driving much of its climate commitments.96
Fourth, other initiatives focus on increasing pressure on investors,
lenders, and insurers to increase the pressure on the firms they invest in, lend to, and insure.97 Examples include 350.org’s divestiture
campaigns98 and many advocacy groups’ efforts to increase the use
89. See id. at 10553.
90. See id. For example, Bank of America has disclosed the risks presented by
reputational harm from the “perception of [its] environmental, social and governance practices
and disclosures.” Bank of Am. Corp., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 8, at 16.
91. See Hoffman, supra note 77, at 42.
92. See Leonard, supra note 30, at 10555-56. CDP is a nonprofit organization that collects
and publishes data from companies, cities, and states on climate change, water security, and
deforestation. CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en/ [https://perma.cc/YA2L-Z9QX].
93. See CDP, supra note 92.
94. Welcome to GRI, GRI, https://globalreporting.org [https://perma.cc/3H2H-YKE3].
95. See Leonard, supra note 30, at 10553.
96. See Cassie Phillips, Jonathan Gilligan, Stephen Harper, Jackie Roberts & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Beyond Politics: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change, 48 ENV’T
L. REP. 11049, 11054-56 (2018) (panel discussion).
97. See Leonard, supra note 30, at 10553-54.
98. See Galperin, Board Rooms and Jail Cells, supra note 68, at 456-58.
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of fossil fuel screens by investment firms and pension funds.99
Initiatives by climate advocacy groups such as Ceres include an
element of simple disclosure as well as naming and shaming to
increase pressure on investors, which in turn may induce investors
to create pressure for GHG reductions by corporations.100 Climate
Action 100+ is an investor initiative led by Ceres,101 an environmental advocacy group, and the initiative attempts to increase the
pressure on over 250 of the world’s largest companies to reduce
GHGs.102
Fifth, other initiatives focus on inducing firms to take specific
action, such as adopting GHG reduction goals, buying renewable
power, or imposing supply chain contracts on suppliers.103 Three
initiatives demonstrate the focus on specific actions. As to climate
goals, the Science Based Target Initiative (SBTi) is a partnership
between CDP, the UN Global Compact, World Resources Institute,
and the World Wide Fund for Nature that works with companies to
provide specific GHG reduction targets.104 The GHG targets are
designed to account for the companies’ share of reductions necessary
to achieve the Paris Agreement goal of holding global average temperatures to under a 2ºC increase over pre-industrial levels, and
more recently to achieve under a 1.5ºC increase.105 SBTi discloses
the companies that have made commitments to achieve SBTi targets, provides technical support, and assesses how likely the companies are to meet the targets.106 As to renewable power purchases,
99. See Stern & Dietz, supra note 70, at 2; Phillips et al., supra note 96, at 11055-56.
100. See Climate Action 100+, CERES, https://www.ceres.org/initiatives/climate-action-100
[https://perma.cc/4APY-CJYY].
101. See id.
102. Tim Buckley & Saurabh Trivedi, From Zero to 50: Global Finance Is Fleeing Oil &
Gas, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS (Oct. 2020), https://ieefa.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/10/From-Zero-to-50-Global-Finance-is-Fleeing-Oil-and-Gas_October-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6E9W-D3BM].
103. See Leonard, supra note 30, at 10556, 10558, 10561.
104. See Who We Are, SCI. BASED TARGETS, https://sciencebasedtargets.org/about-us#whowe-are [https://perma.cc/FX7N-8C3H]. Its core funding is provided by IKEA Foundation, We
Mean Business, The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and The UPS Foundation with additional
support from a diverse group of companies and organizations. See Funders, SCI. BASED
TARGETS, https://sciencebasedtargets.org/about-us/funders [https://perma.cc/4J2T-2HYN].
105. See About Us, SCI. BASED TARGETS, https://sciencebasedtargets.org/about-us [https://
perma.cc/9NWY-MMAP].
106. See id.
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REBA is a joint corporate advocacy group initiative that facilitates
commitments by over 200 firms to procure 100 percent renewable
power.107 Corporate climate commitments, such as those made by
Google and Facebook, and corporate-NGO collaborations to promote
renewable power, such as REBA, increase pressure on utilities to
provide renewable power and have facilitated substantial growth in
renewable power even in states that are either on the sidelines or
actively hostile to climate mitigation.108 The scale of these purchases
is remarkable. For instance, Google (via Alphabet) disclosed that in
2019 it purchased 1,600 megawatts of renewable energy through
participation in over eighteen new energy deals and anticipated
construction of two billion dollars in new energy infrastructure.109
Many recent initiatives have focused on increasing supply chain
contracting commitments by inducing firms to commit to disclosing
and reducing the GHG emissions not only from the firm’s operations, but also from the operations of its suppliers.110 By inducing
firms to calculate, disclose, and reduce the GHG emissions of their
entire value chain, including suppliers, these initiatives create
incentives for the firm to serve as a private regulator of other

107. See Our Vision, RENEWABLE ENERGY BUYERS ALL. (REBA), https://rebuyers.org/about/
vision [https://perma.cc/Y9ZW-ELKM].
108. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jim Rossi & Ian Faucher, The Gap-Filling Role of
Private Environmental Governance, 38 VA. ENV’T L.J. 1, 41-44, 54 (2020).
109. Alphabet, Inc., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 4, at 8. Additionally, General Motors disclosed that in 2019, it executed a green tariff to source 300,000 megawatt hours of renewable
energy. General Motors Co., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 5, at 7.
110. See, e.g., Intel Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 13 (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50863/000005086320000011/a12282019q4-10kdocument.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZJ59-YVFY]. Among the Fortune 100 firms discussed in Part II.B, Intel
provided one of the most extensive disclosures regarding supply chain contracting:
We have robust programs to educate and engage suppliers that support our
global manufacturing operations to drive responsible and sustainable practices
throughout the supply chain. Actively managing our supply chain creates
business value for Intel and our customers by helping to reduce risk, improve
product quality, achieve environmental and social goals, and raise the overall
performance of our suppliers. Over the past five years, we completed more than
600 supplier audits using the Responsible Business Alliance Code of Conduct
standard. We actively collaborate with other companies and lead industry
initiatives on key issues such as advancing responsible minerals sourcing,
improving transparency around climate and water impacts in the global
electronics supply chain, and addressing risks of forced and bonded labor.
Id.

2022]

DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE CLIMATE TRANSITION RISKS

1719

firms.111 The growing focus on supply chain contracting has led to
programs by CDP and the Environmental Law Institute in the
United States, and the Chancery Lane Project in the United Kingdom, among other nonprofit groups.112 An example of the large effects supply chain contracting can have on corporate buyers and
suppliers is Walmart’s Project Gigaton, through which Walmart is
working with WWF and other advocacy groups to achieve a billion
tons of GHG emissions reductions from its tens of thousands of
global suppliers by 2030.113
2. Types of Risk
PEG climate initiatives not only have major climate and economic
consequences, but also pose a type of transition risk that is distinct
from government regulatory risks. PEG climate initiative-based
transition risks differ from regulatory risks in that they are driven
by many types of private actors, not by government legislative or
regulatory bodies.114 This difference between private initiative-based
and regulatory-based transition risks is critical for understanding
climate policy because it affects both the feasibility of creating climate change mitigation pressure on firms and the durability of that
pressure. As the last thirty years demonstrate, adopting major new
environmental legislation is difficult,115 and as the last four years
demonstrate, federal regulatory efforts can easily be repealed,
111. See Leonard, supra note 30, at 10553, 10561-62.
112. See, e.g., CARBON TRUST, Cascading Commitments: Driving Ambitious Action Through
Supply Chain Engagement 1, 9, 11 (2019), https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d
987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/004/072/original/CDP_Sup
ply_Chain_Report_2019.pdf?1550490556 [https://perma.cc/SXS7-PMUR] (providing CDP’s
2018-2019 Supply Chain Report); Private Environmental Governance, ENV’T L. INST., https://
www.eli.org/private-environmental-governance [https://perma.cc/K9XL-Q5PH]; About the
Chancery Lane Project, CHANCERY LANE PROJECT, https://chancerylaneproject.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/WPW3-LM3M].
113. See generally Leonard, supra note 30, at 10550-51, 10553, 10558 (discussing PEG
climate initiatives and Project Gigaton).
114. See GREEN, supra note 69, at 1.
115. See Vandenbergh, supra note 27, at 131 (stating that no major new pollution control
statutes have been adopted since 1990); DAVID GARDINER & ASSOCS., FEDERAL CLIMATE LEGISLATION: AN OVERVIEW OF POLICIES BENEFICIAL TO ACHIEVING CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY
GOALS 5-6 (2020), https://www.dgardiner.com/federal-climate-legislation-an-overview-of-pol
icies-beneficial-to-achieving-corporate-sustainability-goals/ [https://perma.cc/X4DR-HY7T]
(discussing difficulty of adopting new climate legislation).
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replaced, or delayed.116 PEG climate initiatives draw on the preferences and motivations of consumers, employees, investors, and
firms, and can lead to greenwashing or other adverse effects in some
cases, but these initiatives are not subject to gerrymandering, the
asymmetric power of rural states that is baked into our constitutional design, or a Supreme Court that is not receptive to broad
views of federal legislative or regulatory power.117 PEG climate initiatives thus are a discrete phenomenon from a climate policy
perspective, because they provide public and private policy makers
with the ability to create and sustain pressure for decarbonization
even when demand for federal leadership has not overcome the
structural, ideological, and interest group barriers to more comprehensive federal climate legislation.118
The difference between private initiative-based and government
regulatory-based transition risks is also critical for understanding
the financial position of firms. Private initiatives can be adopted
and implemented even if the political system is captured by antiregulatory ideologies or fossil fuel interests.119 They thus pose transition risks that exist for firms even if national or subnational
governments do not act to reduce GHG emissions or act to undermine climate statutes, regulations, and policies. As a result, even if
divided government continues or swings continue between pro- and
anti-climate mitigation administrations, PEG climate initiatives
may continue to affect the financial results of the firms that participate in or are targeted by them.120 Firms that can capture
agencies and undermine public governance may be less able to control, or at least insulate themselves from, private initiatives. For instance, the ability to influence elections and lobby Congress or the
Environmental Protection Agency does not insulate a company from
public shaming or loss of B-to-B customers if corporate buyers have
adopted procurement policies with renewable energy or GHG reduction requirements. A disclosure regime that conflates transition
116. See ENV’T L. INST., ENVIRONMENT 2021: WHAT COMES NEXT? 7-9 (2020) (discussing
Trump administration deregulatory actions and potential responses).
117. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Bruce M. Johnson, The Role of Private Environmental
Governance in Climate Adaptation, FRONTIERS CLIMATE, Sept. 2021, at 1, 2 n.1, 3-4.
118. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 38, at 3-4.
119. See Vandenbergh, supra note 27, at 161-62.
120. See id.
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risks with government regulation risks can be expected to produce
uneven firm disclosures and to provide investors with inadequate
information about these risks.
3. Materiality
Even if private climate initiatives are a widespread, discrete form
of transition risk, under current SEC reporting requirements these
risks may not be worthy of disclosure if they are not material to a
reasonable investor.121 Yet a large body of academic and policy literature, statements by major investors and corporate officials, and
actions by governments suggest that PEG climate initiatives often
have the attributes of material risks: they occur at a substantial
scale and have the types of effects on the supply and demand for
goods and services, the preferences of investors, and other aspects
of markets that easily could result in material effects for any one
firm.122 For instance, academic and government reports have concluded that PEG climate initiatives and other non-state actor initiatives have reduced GHG emissions by more than a billion tons
per year on a global level and by hundreds of millions of tons in the
United States, and can achieve additional reductions of billions of
tons globally, outcomes that would be difficult to achieve without
major financial effects on firms as well.123 In addition, many PEG
121. See, e.g., Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 99—Materiality (Aug. 12, 1999), https://www.
sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6GD-J4J5] (“A matter is ‘material’ if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important” and
concluding that numerical thresholds are insufficient to determine materiality.); FIN. ACCT.
STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 2: QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 46 (1980) (“The omission or misstatement of an
item in a financial report is material if, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying
upon the report would have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the
item.”). According to the Supreme Court, a fact is material if there is “a substantial likelihood
that the ... fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 449 (1976).
122. See Vandenbergh & Gilligan, supra note 33, at 218-19.
123. See, e.g., DATA DRIVEN YALE, NEWCLIMATE INST. & PBL NETHERLANDS ENV’T ASSESSMENT AGENCY, GLOBAL CLIMATE ACTION FROM CITIES, REGIONS, AND BUSINESSES 35-36
(2018), https://newclimate.org/2018/08/30/global-climate-action-from-cities-regions-and-busi
nesses/ [https://perma.cc/BJ4R-5S2F]; YALE DATA-DRIVEN ENV’T SOLS. GRP., WHO’S ACTING
ON CLIMATE CHANGE?: SUBNATIONAL AND NON-STATE GLOBAL CLIMATE ACTION 6 (2017),
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initiatives focus on enhancing or reducing the reputation of firms,
and reputation constitutes more than half of the value of many
firms.124 Statements by leading institutional investors125 and corporate executives126 also suggest that PEG climate initiatives often
have had or will have major financial effects on firms in some
industries.
An additional indication that PEG climate initiatives are likely
to have material effects for some industry sectors is the fact that
the potential targets of these initiatives have mobilized sympathetic
politicians to try to destroy them. Examples include a Trump executive order targeting ERISA fiduciary duties regarding the use of
ESG criteria to screen out investments in firms associated with
fossil fuels, which resulted in an ERISA fiduciary duty rule on this
issue,127 the Trump Comptroller of the Currency’s rule prohibiting
banks from adopting policies disfavoring funding for fossil fuel projects,128 a 2020 letter from several members of Congress threatening
https://datadrivenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/DDY_Taking-Stock-of-Global-ClimateAction.pdf [https://perma.cc/PKR4-U49X]; UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS
GAP REPORT 2018 31; VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 38, at 3 (concluding that PEG
climate initiatives could achieve a billion tons per year in GHG emissions reductions).
124. See David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy,
16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 599, 601-02 (2007); DANIEL DIERMEIER, REPUTATION RULES
x-xvi (2011).
125. See, e.g., Letter from BlackRock’s Global Executive Committee to Clients (Jan. 14,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-23-19/s72319-6706471-206111.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E28S-VMWQ] (informing clients that BlackRock will be participating in the low carbon
economic transition and noting that climate change is “increasingly material to investment
outcomes”); Letter from BlackRock’s Global Executive Committee to Clients (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000177-3f22-da54-a9ff-fff3c0f80000 [https://perma.cc/GPR9M2EE] (noting that BlackRock will be “[a]sking companies to disclose a business plan aligned
with the goal of limiting global warming to well below 2ºC, consistent with achieving net zero
global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050”).
126. See Klump et al., supra note 41 (quoting Dominion Chief Executive Officer for the
proposition that “we are on an unwavering and industry-leading path to net-zero emissions,
consistent with state-level policy priorities. A more sustainable energy future is what our
shareholders, customers, communities and employees want, and we intend to deliver.”).
127. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846 (Nov. 13, 2020)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550). The rule was issued under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and requires retirement plan fiduciaries to base
investment decisions only on “pecuniary factors.” See Cheryl Bolen, Final ‘Do-Good’ Investing
Rule Released by Labor Department, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 30, 2020, 5:06 PM), https://news.
bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/final-do-good-investing-rule-released-by-labor-depart
ment [https://perma.cc/RX62-NWDA].
128. Fair Access to Financial Services, 85 Fed. Reg. 75,261 (Nov. 25, 2020) (to be codified
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JPMorgan Chase and other banks after they announced that they
would not lend to oil drilling in the Arctic, a threatening letter from
treasurers and attorneys general from conservative states threatening the banking industry with “collective action” to discourage
fossil fuel-related lending restrictions, and an effort by the American Legislative Exchange Council to induce state legislatures to
adopt model legislation designed to discourage the SEC from requiring disclosure and to discourage banks from participating in PEG
climate initiatives.129
The materiality of PEG climate initiatives and their distinctive
characteristics can be understood through a hypothetical based
loosely on an actual PEG climate initiative.130 Imagine that you are
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 55); Michelle Price, Wall Street Banks Can’t Snub Certain Industry Sectors
Under Proposed New Rule, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2020, 4:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/usa-regulation-lendingidUSL4N2I63NQ [https://perma.cc/6GN6-3PSL].
129. Alaska Lawmakers: Discrimination Involved in Arctic Decision, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(June 18, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/8d93042083896fd836625c780d63c2be [https://
perma.cc/4VQM-85SQ] (noting that Alaska’s congressional delegation issued a letter saying
that banks that prohibit or limit investment in new petroleum refining projects in the Arctic
may be discriminating against the people that rely on the industry). Advocacy group
reputation campaigns and investor and lender campaigns appear to have played an important
role in discouraging petroleum firms from bidding on oil drilling rights in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge. See Henry Fountain, Sale of Arctic Drilling Leases Draws an Unusual Taker.
It May Be the Only One., N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/30/
climate/anwr-arctic-drilling-leases.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/ATW5YH67] (stating that according to an energy financial analyst “companies were highly unlikely
to bid, given the cost of exploring and drilling for oil in the Arctic, the potential damage to
their reputations from operating on lands prized by environmentalists, the growing movement
among major banks to refuse to finance drilling in the refuge, and the depressed state of the
industry amid the coronavirus pandemic”); Letter from Riley Moore, State Treasurer, State
of West Virginia, to Whom it May Concern in the U.S. Banking Industry (Nov. 22, 2021),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21128588-fossil-fuel-banking-letter-nov-22
[https://perma.cc/78XS-QP3M] (notifying banks that the letter authors will be taking “collective action in response to the ongoing and growing economic boycott of traditional energy
production industries by U.S. financial institutions”); Kenny Stancil, ‘Alarming’: ALEC’s New
Model Bill Would Penalize Banks for Divesting From Fossil Fuels, COMMON DREAMS (Dec. 8,
2021), https://www.commondreams.org/news/2021/12/08/alarming-alecs-new-model-bill-wouldpenalize-banks-divesting-fossil-fuels [https://perma.cc/4QAV-BAFR]. For an overview of recent
efforts to discourage PEG climate initiatives, see Kate Aronoff, Conservatives Have a New
Bogeyman: Critical Energy Theory, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 7, 2021), https://newrepublic.com/
article/164641/conservatives-new-bogeyman-critical-energy-theory [https://perma.cc/94EXRE68].
130. For background on Walmart’s climate commitments, see VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 38, at 184. For background on Walmart’s light bulb procurement and the
effects on U.S. energy use and GHG emissions, see Lucas W. Davis, Evidence of a Decline in
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an investor in 2005 in a firm that derives much of its revenue from
manufacturing light bulbs sold to major retailers. The firm has
managed its investments in new plants and equipment to ensure
that its light bulbs, which include traditional incandescent bulbs as
well as more efficient compact fluorescents (CFLs), will meet federal
regulatory requirements for light bulb efficiency and will do so for
the foreseeable future. The firm has accurately described to shareholders that light bulb sales are an important aspect of the firm’s
business and that the firm complies with all government laws,
regulations, and policies. Through its trade association, the firm has
supported limited efficiency requirements that will encourage use
of CFLs but discourage use of more efficient light-emitting diode
(LED) bulbs, which the firm is not well positioned to manufacture.
The firm discloses the risks that may arise from future government
regulatory requirements and business trends regarding the price of
natural resources, labor, and the demand for light bulbs. The firm
also is ahead of its time in thinking about climate change and discloses that it does not anticipate material adverse effects from the
physical or transition risks posed by climate change.
The firm’s major customer is Walmart, however, and Walmart is
massive, with sales that exceed its nearest competitor, Target, by
more than ten times. Walmart has been the subject of naming
and shaming initiatives by advocacy groups regarding its environmental, health care, and other practices, and Walmart has begun
collaborating with the Environmental Defense Fund and other environmental advocacy groups to reduce its carbon footprint and
improve its reputation. Even absent federal or state government
requirements to do so, Walmart announces major climate commitments and, to follow through on those commitments, announces
that because LED bulbs are far more efficient than CFLs, producing
less GHG emissions during the lifetime of each bulb, Walmart will
sell and promote as its house brand only LED bulbs. It announces
that the first manufacturer that can make an LED bulb that

Electricity Use by U.S. Households, 37 ECON. BULL. 1098 (2017) (noting correlation between
Walmart’s LED initiative and a decline in household electricity use); Jonathan M. Gilligan
& Michael P. Vandenbergh, A Framework for Assessing the Impact of Private Climate Governance, 60 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 1 (2020) (calculating that Walmart’s LED light bulb
initiative reduced U.S. GHG emissions by 127 million tons per year).
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generates attractive light for under ten dollars per bulb will become
its preferred supplier. A small manufacturer wins this race and becomes Walmart’s leading supplier.
As the discussion in Part III demonstrates, the light bulb manufacturing firm’s disclosure likely complied with the requirements
of government agencies and the recommendations of hybrid disclosure regimes.131 Unfortunately for the investor in the light bulb
firm, however, Walmart’s response to climate advocates has wiped
out much of the market for incandescent and CFL bulbs, and unfortunately for the investors in the light bulb manufacturing firm,
the firm did not disclose, and investors did not have the information
necessary to account for, the material financial risk posed by the
PEG climate initiatives directed at Walmart and later participated
in by Walmart through its requirements for light bulb suppliers.
The light bulb firm followed SEC reporting requirements, and it
even anticipated the climate disclosure directions provided by the
SEC in the 2010 guidance and other disclosure regimes, but these
requirements and clarifying documents did not specify that firms
are required to assess and disclose the material transition risks
posed by PEG climate initiatives such as Walmart’s commitment to
switch to LED bulbs.
The harms arising from the types of inadequate disclosure of PEG
climate risks outlined in this hypothetical affect not only investors,
but also climate change mitigation efforts. The lack of disclosure
undermines the ability of advocacy groups to assess the efficacy of
their private initiatives and the ability of philanthropists to allocate
resources to the most effective groups and initiatives. It undermines
corporate directors’ ability to assess the performance of corporate
managers, and corporate managers’ ability to assess whether they
should get on the bandwagon regarding PEG climate initiatives,
changing their product mix and imposing new requirements on their
suppliers. It also undermines government policymakers’ ability to
anticipate the contribution that PEG climate initiatives will make
to climate change mitigation and to allocate government resources
in ways that leverage the most effective PEG climate initiatives and
avoid duplicating those initiatives.

131. See infra Part III.
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The research results demonstrate that PEG climate initiatives
are widespread and are producing major carbon emissions reductions,132 but they are just indications that PEG climate initiatives
may be posing material transition risks, and it is possible that these
initiatives are posing risks, but the risks are not material to some
large firms. For instance, there are indications that investors have
shown less interest in climate risk disclosures than some early
predictions: an HSBC survey of two thousand investors found that
just 10 percent viewed the disclosures as a relevant source of information.133 Similarly, a recent assessment suggests that the movement for climate-related fossil fuel divestiture may be more common
among institutional investors than retail investors.134 To examine
whether firms view PEG climate initiatives as posing material risks
and disclose those risks, in Part II.B, this Article presents the
results of the empirical study of climate disclosures included in the
most recent annual reports by the Fortune 100 firms and the largest
firms in sectors likely to be under the most pressure from PEG
climate initiatives.135

132. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 38, at 3-4.
133. See Leslie Hook & Matthew Vincent, Green Business Reporting Rules at Risk of Pale
Response, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/ad01f2c9-9eb0-4db6-9898220c688d16c2 [https://perma.cc/SGZ2-T9XG]. Another concern is that firms discuss risks, but
do not act based on those risks. Id. (quoting an economist at the Institute for Public Policy
Research).
134. See Felix Mormann, Why the Divestment Movement Is Missing the Mark, 10 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 1067, 1067-68 (2020) (arguing that ESG commitments by individual investors lag behind institutional investors). But see Michael Wursthorn, Investors Pile into ETFs
Devoted to Socially Responsible ESG, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2020, 4:51 PM), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/investors-pile-into-etfs-devoted-to-socially-responsible-esg-11608114604 [https://
perma.cc/68DQ-WAH2] (noting that in 2020, retail investors in the United States added a
record $27.4 billion to ESG exchange-traded funds); PWC, 2022: THE GROWTH OPPORTUNITY
OF THE CENTURY 6 (2020), https://www.pwc.lu/en/sustainable-finance/esg-report-the-growthopportunity-of-the-century.html [https://perma.cc/D3Q8-ST3K] (noting that by 2025, more
than 50 percent of mutual fund assets in Europe may be held in ESG funds).
135. For a list of the firms included in the study and the study results, see 2021
Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure spreadsheet, supra note 43.
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B. Empirical Study
1. Methodology
This study examined the most recent annual reports (10-Ks) filed
with the SEC by the Fortune 100 companies, as well as the five
largest firms in each of the petroleum refining, coal, and electric
utility sectors.136 The study examined only the annual reports of
these companies, not sustainability reports or other disclosure documents.137 The annual reports provide a valuable snapshot of the
disclosure practices of these companies but are not presumed to be
a representative sample of the annual reports of all publicly traded
firms or of all the reports and statements issued by the firms studied. The annual reports provide an in-depth review, however, of the
risks and opportunities a company deems financially material to its
investors or otherwise subject to disclosure based on SEC regulations, guidance documents, and court interpretations of materiality.138 The study examined each company’s most recent annual
report to assess whether the report included disclosures of risks
posed by PEG climate initiatives.
To structure the assessment, the study examined whether firms
disclose several general types of pressure that PEG initiatives may
create for firms or pressure that PEG initiatives may induce one
firm to transfer to other firms (disclosure of external advocacy group
pressure; public, reputation or brand pressure; employee pressure;
investor pressure; insurer pressure; lender pressure; and supply
chain contract pressure). Given the dominant role of climate change
in environmental and sustainability risks and governance, the study
included climate-specific disclosures regarding these general types
of pressure on firms as well as disclosures regarding environmental
and sustainability issues generally. The study also examined disclosure of several specific PEG climate initiatives (disclosure of
participation in or pressure from CDP reporting,139 Science-based
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. CDP is a nonprofit organization that collects and publishes data from companies,
cities, and states on climate change, water security, and deforestation. See CDP, supra note
92.
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Target Initiative commitments, and Climate Action 100). These
aspects of PEG initiatives do not capture all the ways in which
private initiatives may create or reflect material financial risks for
firms, but they include many of the most important potential
sources of risk, and this research screen reduced the chance of
overlooking important PEG climate disclosures.
The Fortune 100 companies conduct a wide range of businesses
and operate in forty sectors.140 Fortune ranks the Fortune 100 companies by total revenue for their respective fiscal years and includes
only companies that are incorporated in and operate in the United
States and file financial documents with a government agency.141
This includes companies that file a 10-K with the SEC and mutual
insurance companies that file with state regulators.142 Only the
companies with publicly traded equities that filed with the SEC
were included in the study, and because the Fortune 100 firms
include seven mutual insurance companies that do not file 10-Ks
with the SEC, ninety-three firms were included in the study.143
Fortune assumes that revenues are as reported by the companies,
including revenues from discontinued operations when published,144
and data for 2020 Fortune 100 companies are for the fiscal year that
ended on or before January 31, 2020.145
The Fortune 100 only includes a handful of companies in the
sectors most likely to be affected by climate change mitigation: the
five largest petroleum refining firms are all in the Fortune 100, but
no coal firms are in the Fortune 100 and only one electric utility
company is in the Fortune 100.146 To obtain an initial snapshot of
disclosure patterns in these sectors, the five largest firms in each of
these three sectors were examined.147 The ranking of the top five
utilities and petroleum refining companies was based on Fortune
data and is measured by gross revenue, and the top five petroleum
140. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
141. Methodology for Fortune 500, FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/franchise-list-page/for
tune-500-methodology-2020/ [https://perma.cc/MH85-3WFD].
142. Id.
143. See Fortune 500, FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/fortune500/2020/search/ [https://perma.
cc/K4G6-S254].
144. Methodology for Fortune 500, supra note 141.
145. Id.
146. See Fortune 500, supra note 143.
147. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
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refining companies are all in the Fortune 100.148 The top five coal
companies were selected based on a U.S. Energy Information Administration ranking of the amount of coal produced by each company.149 The coal companies were selected based on the amount of
coal produced rather than gross revenue because the financial turmoil in the coal industry makes revenue a less valuable indicator of
the importance of a firm within the sector. For all firms, the 10-Ks
examined are the most recent 10-Ks filed by each company as of
September 29, 2020.150
2. Results
The results demonstrate that many firms recognize and disclose
the importance of the risks posed by PEG initiatives. Thirty-six of
the ninety-three firms included in the study (39 percent) disclosed
information about PEG initiatives.151 As to the types of PEG disclosures, among the Fortune 100 firms, thirty firms in more than a
dozen sectors disclosed public, reputation, or brand pressure regarding climate change (for example, AT&T, Archer Daniels Midland,
Microsoft, Exxon Mobil, General Electric, Procter & Gamble, Target,
and World Fuel Services).152 Eleven firms in seven sectors disclosed
148. Id.
149. Many of the largest coal producing firms are in or have recently emerged from bankruptcy, and, as of 2019, the entire market capitalization of the twelve largest firms in the coal
industry was just over ten billion dollars. See U.S. Coal Companies Continue to Lose Market
Value, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS (Jan. 11, 2019), https://ieefa.org/u-s-coal-com
panies-continue-to-lose-market-value/ [https://perma.cc/TMB9-E6JH].
150. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., AT&T Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/0000732717/000156276220000064/t-20191231.htm [https://perma.cc/
QK73-WPTW]; Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000007084/000000708420000009/adm-2019
1231x10k.htm [https://perma.cc/W5PD-CYCK]; Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K)
(July 30, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000789019/000156459020034944/
msft-10k_20200630.htm [https://perma.cc/3G9V-TMRZ]; Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000034088/0000034
08820000016/xom10k2019.htm [https://perma.cc/D6FJ-WXZN]; Gen. Elec. Co., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000040545/00000
4054520000009/ge10-k2019.htm [https://perma.cc/K9ZC-HQAC]; Procter & Gamble Co.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/00000
80424/000008042420000053/pg-20200630.htm [https://perma.cc/3DNU-BD9Z]; Target Corp.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/00000

1730

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1695

investor pressure (for example, American Airlines, JPMorgan
Chase, Intel, and PepsiCo).153 Ten firms in seven sectors disclosed
supply chain contracting pressure (for example, Alphabet (Google),
HP, Microsoft, Target, and Lowe’s).154 Nine firms in five sectors
disclosed external advocacy group pressure (for example, Chevron,
JPMorgan Chase, and PepsiCo).155 One firm disclosed employee
27419/000002741920000008/tgt-20200201.htm [https://perma.cc/R2F9-P8KF]; World Fuel
Servs. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Ar
chives/edgar/data/0000789460/000162828020002590/a2019q410-k.htm [https://perma.cc/F5
BY-WYXX]. The PepsiCo disclosure provided an example of climate and other environmental
reputational pressure:
There is also increased focus, including by governmental and non-governmental
organizations, investors, customers and consumers on these and other environmental sustainability matters, including deforestation, land use, climate impact
and recyclability or recoverability of packaging, including plastic. Our reputation
can be damaged if we or others in our industry do not act, or are perceived not
to act, responsibly with respect to our impact on the environment.
PepsiCo, Inc., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 2, at 30.
153. See, e.g., American Airlines Grp. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000006201/000000620120000023/a10k123119.htm
[https://perma.cc/R7RG-JPV8]; JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 7;
PepsiCo, Inc., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 2; Intel Corp., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 110.
154. For instance, Lowe’s disclosed that “[w]e give considerable attention to how our products are created and to the people who make them. Through collaboration and established
management systems, we monitor our suppliers’ practices to secure high-quality products
from suppliers who support worker rights and protect the environment.” Lowe’s Cos., Inc.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/
data/60667/000006066720000036/form10k01312020.htm [https://perma.cc/N2HL-AJSC].
Alphabet included “enabling a responsible supply chain” in its sustainability disclosure.
Alphabet, Inc., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 4, at 8. Microsoft stated that it “launched a new
initiative to use Microsoft technology to help our suppliers and customers around the world
reduce their own carbon footprint.” Microsoft Corp., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 152, at 6.
155. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 7; FedEx Corp., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) (July 20, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001048911/00015
6459020032775/fdx-10k_20200531.htm [https://perma.cc/5UL9-Y5Y4]. Chevron’s disclosure
mentions the potential effects of climate advocacy initiatives on investors and the market
for its securities:
organizations that provide information to investors on corporate governance and
related matters have developed ratings processes for evaluating companies on
their approach to ESG matters. Such ratings are used by some investors to
inform their investment and voting decisions. Unfavorable ESG ratings may
lead to increased negative investor sentiment toward Chevron and our industry
and to the diversion of investment to other industries, which could have a
negative impact on our stock price and our access to and costs of capital.
Chevron Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 21 (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/0000093410/000009341020000010/cvx12312019-10kdoc.htm
[https://perma.cc/9W5S-LBS4].
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pressure (JPMorgan Chase).156 No firms on the Fortune 100 list
disclosed insurer pressure (although several coal firms did, as discussed below).157 Two firms in the banking sector and two in the
pipeline sector disclosed lender pressure.158 Five firms in three sectors disclosed that they provide GHG emissions data to CDP (such
as, Alphabet, Home Depot, and Intel).159 No firms disclosed information relating to Climate Action 100 or SBTi.160 Several firms disclosed information about other types of possible PEG climate issues,
such as disclosures related to TCFD or participation in the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design private building certification system (LEED), which may reduce GHG emissions through
more efficient building design and operation (for example, American
Airlines, FedEx, and Citigroup).161
As indicated by Table 1, in ten sectors, every firm’s disclosure
included a discussion of some type of PEG initiative.162 For instance,
all three airlines in the Fortune 100 reported public, reputational,
or brand pressure.163 One airline also reported pressure regarding procurement of renewable fuels,164 and two reported investor

156. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 7; Best Buy Co., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000764478/000076447
820000017/bby-20200201x10k.htm [https://perma.cc/ZR7J-GZUP].
157. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
158. Plains GP Holdings, L.P., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001581990/000158199020000005/pagp-20191231.htm [https://
perma.cc/TV6C-VH9Q].
159. See, e.g., Alphabet, Inc., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 4, at 8; Home Depot, Inc., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000354
950/000035495020000015/hd10k02022020.htm [https://perma.cc/45XV-B7JP]; Intel Corp.,
2019 Form 10-K, supra note 110, at 14.
160. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
161. See, e.g., Am. Airlines Grp. Inc., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 153; FedEx Corp., 2019
Form 10-K, supra note 155; Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 21, 2020), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000831001/000083100120000031/c-12312019x10k.htm
[https://perma.cc/6KGW-JJ79].
162. See infra Table 1.
163. See Am. Airlines Grp. Inc., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 153, at 13; Delta Air Lines,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 9-10 (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/0000027904/000002790420000004/dal-20191231.htm [https://perma.cc/R5FK-C5DW];
United Airlines, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Ar
chives/edgar/data/0000319687/000010051720000010/ual201910k.htm [https://perma.cc/BP35D3W2].
164. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
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pressure.165 Most of the disclosing firms and sectors appear to follow
a pattern: they are either fossil-fuel-heavy or high GHG-emitting
firms and sectors (for example, energy, mining, and crude oil production) or firms that may have high vulnerability to transition
risks arising from PEG climate initiatives, such as business-toconsumer (B-to-C) firms and sectors (for example, food consumer
products, household and personal products, mail, package, and
freight delivery, and specialty retailers) or both (airlines).166 The
pattern is not uniform, however: the only firm in the industrial
machinery sector, which is neither a particularly high GHG-emitting sector nor a B-to-C sector, also includes a PEG disclosure.167
Table 1. Sectors with PEG Climate Disclosure by All Firms (ten
sectors/twenty firms)
Sector

Number of Firms in
Sector

Airlines

3

Energy

1

Food Consumer Products

1

Household and Personal Products

1

Industrial Machinery

1

Mail, Package, and Freight Delivery

2

Mining, Crude Oil Production

1

Petroleum Refining

5

Semiconductors and Other Components

1

Specialty Retailers

4

A remarkable amount of heterogeneity exists in disclosures, with
similar firms and similar sectors varying widely in their disclosure
practices and many firms and sectors providing no disclosure at
all.168 As indicated by Table 2, in eleven sectors at least one firm
disclosed information about PEG climate initiatives while at least

165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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one other firm did not.169 This occurred across several types of
sectors and among firms within sectors.170 B-to-C firms within sectors such as banking, general merchandise, and computer software
varied in their reporting of PEG pressure.171 For instance, as discussed at the outset, the two automakers included in the Fortune
100 varied in their reporting practices: GM included a PEG climate
disclosure regarding its renewable power requirements for electricity procurement, but Ford did not.172 Of the six insurance
companies that filed annual reports with the SEC, only one (AIG)
disclosed PEG climate risks.173 Among the banks, Bank of America,174 Citigroup, and JPMorgan175 disclosed PEG pressures or PEG
climate initiative risks, but Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs Group,
Morgan Stanley, and Capital One Financial did not.176 In the annual
reports of software and technology companies such as Apple and
Google, the disclosure patterns regarding PEG climate transition
risks varied widely even though both are among the global leaders
in committing to aggressive climate goals and reducing corporate
GHG emissions.177 Pipeline companies are B-to-B firms but are also
169. See infra Table 2.
170. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
171. Id.
172. See General Motors Co., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 5, at 7; Ford Motor Co., 2019
Form 10-K, supra note 5.
173. See Am. Int’l Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 160 (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000005272/000110465920023889/aig-20191231.htm
[https://perma.cc/H3CJ-JPML].
174. Bank of Am. Corp., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 8, at 16 (disclosing the risk of
reputational harm from the “perception of [its] environmental, social and governance practices
and disclosures”).
175. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 7, at 25 (“Social and
environmental activists are increasingly targeting financial services firms such as JPMorgan
Chase with public criticism for their relationships with clients that are engaged in certain
sensitive industries, including businesses whose products are or are perceived to be harmful
to human health, or whose activities negatively affect or are perceived to negatively affect the
environment, workers’ rights or communities.”).
176. Fortune lists Bank of America in the commercial banks sector but lists the other
banking firms discussed in this paragraph in the closely related commercial and savings bank
sector. See Fortune 500, supra note 143.
177. Alphabet stated that:
We strive to build sustainability into everything we do from designing and operating efficient data centers, advancing carbon-free energy, creating sustainable
workplaces, building better devices and services, empowering users with technology, and enabling a responsible supply chain. Google has been carbon neutral
since 2007 and we are the largest corporate purchaser of renewable energy in
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fossil fuel-heavy, and only one of the two pipeline companies in the
Fortune 100 reported PEG climate pressure.178
Table 2. Sectors with Mixed PEG Climate Disclosure (ten sectors/
thirty-six firms)
Sector

Firms Disclosing
PEG/Firms in the Sector

Banks: Commercial and Savings

3/7

Computer Software

1/2

Computers, Office Equipment

1/3

Food Production

1/2

General Merchandise

2/3

Insurance: Property and Casualty

1/6

Internet Services and Retailing

2/3

Motor Vehicles and Parts

1/2

Pipelines

1/4

Insurance: Life and Health

1/5

Telecommunications

1/4

For the three fossil-fuel-heavy sectors, a clear pattern emerged—
the industries that produce most fossil fuels disclosed the risks
posed by PEG climate initiatives, but the heaviest users did not.179
The five petroleum-refining companies are also in the Fortune 100,
and all reported some type of PEG climate pressure, as well as
public, reputation, or brand pressure.180 Four reported external advocacy group pressure, and three reported investor pressure.181
the world.
Alphabet, Inc., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 4, at 8.
178. See Plains GP Holdings, L.P., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 158, at 60.
179. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
180. See Marathon Oil Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000101778/000010177820000023/mro-20191231x10k2019.htm
[https://perma.cc/38QW-8LZG]; Valero Energy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 11 (Feb.
26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001035002/000103500220000007/vloform
10-kx12312019.htm [https://perma.cc/5ESJ-35JL]; Phillips 66, Annual Report (Form 10-K),
at 20-21 (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001534701/00015347012
0000070/psx-2019123110k.htm [https://perma.cc/6WMJ-K3EF]; Exxon Mobil Corp., 2019
Form 10-K, supra note 152, at 42-43; Chevron Corp., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 155, at 21.
181. See supra note 168.
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Similarly, the five largest coal producers all disclosed investor
pressure.182 For instance, Peabody Coal disclosed investor, lender,
and insurer pressure when it reported that
the number and quantity of viable financing alternatives
available to us may be significantly impacted by unfavorable
lending and investment policies by financial institutions and
insurance companies associated with concerns about environmental impacts of coal combustion, and negative views around
our efforts with respect to environmental and social matters and
related governance considerations could harm the perception of
our company by certain investors or result in the exclusion of
our securities from consideration by those investors.183

Peabody also noted the PEG climate pressure on the utilities that
buy coal:
Numerous activist groups are devoting substantial resources to
anti-coal activities to minimize or eliminate the use of coal as a
source of electricity generation, domestically and internationally, thereby further reducing the demand and pricing for coal,
and potentially materially and adversely impacting our future
financial results, liquidity and growth prospects.184

Overall, all five of the coal firms disclosed external advocacy group
pressure, three reported insurer pressure, four reported lender
pressure, and four reported public, brand, or reputation pressure.185
In contrast, none of the largest electric utilities disclosed PEG
climate pressure.186 Utilities emit large quantities of GHGs when
they use coal or natural gas for electric power plants, and they have
been the targets not only of national and subnational government
regulatory measures, but also of numerous PEG climate initiatives,
as the Peabody disclosure suggests.187 The effect of the “numerous
182. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
183. Peabody Energy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at ii (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001064728/000106472820000007/btu20191231-10k.htm [https://
perma.cc/B3XP-DZ8G].
184. Id.
185. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
186. Id.
187. See Peabody Energy Corp., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 183, at ii.
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activist groups” disclosed by Peabody is to create pressure on
corporations to commit to renewable power. For instance, many of
the utilities’ largest corporate customers, such as Facebook and
Microsoft, participate in REBA, which requires a commitment to
procure 100 percent renewable power.188 Other major corporate
customers of the electric utilities have made major GHG reduction
commitments that cannot be achieved without major reductions in
the GHG emissions associated with electricity use.189 PEG climateinitiative-based pressure thus might be expected to pose a material
risk for some or all of these utilities, but neither Duke Energy,
Excelon, NextEra Energy, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), nor
Southern disclosed PEG climate transition risks.190 PG&E reported
that it submits its emissions data to The Climate Registry, but although the Registry is a nonprofit organization, its directors are
government officials so it does not qualify as a private-sector organization.191 The utilities sector thus departs from the expectation
that fossil-fuel-heavy industries will report PEG pressure.

188. See DAVID GARDINER & ASSOCS., NASHVILLE CARBON COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 1, 7-11
(2020), https://www.dgardiner.com/nashville-carbon-competitiveness/ [https://perma.cc/4VCTDJLQ] (noting the climate commitments of two-thirds of the Fortune 100 and the implications
for electric utilities). An example of a commitment discussed in an annual report is by Microsoft:
We set an ambitious goal to reduce and ultimately remove Microsoft’s carbon
footprint. By 2030 Microsoft will be carbon negative, and by 2050 Microsoft will
remove from the environment all the carbon the company has emitted directly
or by electrical consumption since it was founded in 1975. We also launched a
new initiative to use Microsoft technology to help our suppliers and customers
around the world reduce their own carbon footprint.
Microsoft Corp., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 152, at 6.
189. See DAVID GARDINER & ASSOCS., supra note 188, at 7-11.
190. See Exelon Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Ar
chives/edgar/data/0001109357/000110935720000053/exc-20191231x10k.htm [https://perma.
cc/9ARU-4XNC]; Duke Energy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 20, 2020), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001326160/000132616020000034/duk-20191231x10k.htm
[https://perma.cc/TQ3B-XQ25]; Southern Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000092122/3c46261f-5a4f-454f-8b9f-20c1a5a8dd
95.pdf [https://perma.cc/29BZ-GSTW]; NextEra Energy Partners, LP, Annual Report (Form
10-K) (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001603145/00016031452000
0006/nep-12312019x10k.htm [https://perma.cc/XX7J-E2Y4].
191. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000075488/000100498020000009/pcg-20191231.htm [https://perma.
cc/ASE6-PHGE].
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Finally, as indicated by Table 3, of the forty sectors included in
the Fortune 100, nineteen sectors did not include a firm with at
least one such disclosure.192 For instance, Dow Chemical, the only
firm in the chemicals sector, did not disclose PEG environmental or
climate risks,193 and no aerospace or defense companies disclosed
these risks.
Table 3. Sectors with No PEG Climate Disclosure (twenty sectors/
forty-four firms)
Sector

Number of Firms in
Sector

Aerospace and Defense

5

Apparel

1

Beverages

1

Chemicals

1

Construction and Farm Machinery

2

Diversified Financials

4

Electronics and Electrical Equipment

1

Entertainment

1

Food and Drug Stores

4

Health Care: Insurance and Managed Care

4

Health Care: Medical Facilities

1

Health Care: Pharmacy and Other Services

2

Information Technology Services

1

Network and Other Communications
Equipment

1

Pharmaceuticals

4

Utilities

1

Wholesalers: Electronics and Office Equipment

1

Wholesalers: Food and Grocery

1

Wholesalers: Health Care

3

192. See infra Table 3.
193. See, Dow Chem. Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/0000029915/000175178820000007/dowinc201910k.htm [https://perma.
cc/ABB3-RBY9].
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These non-disclosing firms and sectors do not follow an obvious
pattern regarding the likelihood that PEG climate initiatives may
pose material transition risks.194 They vary in the amount of GHG
emissions attributable to the firm or sector; some non-reporting
firms are major global emitters of GHGs, and some reporting firms
have much smaller emissions.195 They also vary in the likely vulnerability to transition risks arising from PEG climate initiatives;
they include both B-to-C firms and sectors that may be most vulnerable to naming and shaming campaigns directed at retail customers (for example, Coca-Cola in the beverages sector and Disney
in the entertainment sector), as well as B-to-B firms and sectors
that may be less subject to those campaigns but may still be vulnerable to investor or supply chain contracting pressure (for example, Tech Data in the electronics and office equipment sector).196
Overall, more than one-third of the Fortune 100 firms included
PEG climate disclosures, and two of the three industry sectors most
directly exposed to fossil fuels were the most likely to have disclosed
PEG pressure.197 The disclosures provided information about several
types of PEG climate transition risks, with the most common among
the Fortune 100 being public, reputation, or brand pressure, followed by investor pressure, supply chain contracting pressure, and
external advocacy group pressure.198 The drafters of annual reports
for these firms thus appear to have concluded that PEG climate
information is either financially material or otherwise important to
include in a report to investors. But there is a remarkable lack of
consistency among the Fortune 100 firms within the same sector
and between similar sectors.199 The lack of consistency also exists
among the fossil-fuel-heavy sectors, with differences existing

194. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 3; Walt Disney Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001744489/00017
4448919000225/fy2019q410k.htm [https://perma.cc/5CAD-MQW4]; Tech Data Corp., Annual
Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000790703/
000079070320000006/fy2010kdocumentclassic.htm [https://perma.cc/RKD2-MPE5].
195. 2021 Vandenbergh Final PEG Disclosure Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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between the petroleum and coal sectors on the one hand, and
electric utilities on the other.200
The heterogeneity in disclosures does not follow simple patterns
based on the characteristics of firms and sectors. Many B-to-C firms
disclosed PEG climate pressure, as might be expected given their
exposure to public pressure from retail customers, but some did
not.201 Some major banks disclosed, and some did not.202 One automaker disclosed, the other did not. One internet firm disclosed,
the other did not.203 Many B-to-B firms did not disclose PEG climate
pressure, as might be expected given their insulation from retail
customer pressure, but some did.204 Either remarkable differences
exist among firms that appear to be similarly situated financially
or disclosure practices are inconsistent.
II. THE SECURITIES REGULATORY REGIME
Part II explores whether the regulations, guidance documents,
and reports generated by the financial regulatory regime explain the
heterogeneity in firm disclosures identified in Part I. This Part
begins with a discussion of federal securities laws and the 2010
Guidance and then turns to the 2020 CFTC and Federal Reserve
statements on climate disclosures. It then examines the disclosure
recommendations of two leading public-private hybrid regimes,
TCFD and SASB, and it closes with a brief review of other disclosure regimes.
A. Federal Securities Law
The 34 Act governs much of the periodic federal securities disclosure regime, including the SEC’s authority to compel company
disclosures to investors,205 and the 33 Act requires that investors
receive financial information about companies offered for public sale
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a)-(b). Section 4 of the 34 Act established the SEC, which is responsible for enforcing securities laws. Id. § 78d(a).
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and prohibits deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the
sale of securities.206 The SEC promulgates and enforces regulations governing disclosure requirements under section 13 of the 34
Act.207 Section 13 designates as “reporting companies” those firms
that have registered publicly held securities and those of a certain
size, and it requires periodic disclosures in the form of annual reports (10-K) and quarterly reports (10-Q), as well as prompt reporting of certain important events (8-K).208 Information that would
facilitate investors’ ability to assess whether a company’s security
is a good investment is required to be included or incorporated into
these filings.209 The required disclosure includes information about
the company’s officers and directors, the company’s line of business,
audited financial statements, and a management discussion and
analysis section.210 Sections 18(a) and 10(b) of the 34 Act apply to
all disclosures and prohibit false or misleading statements made in
documents filed with the SEC.211 Violations create exposure if they
are material: if an investor bought or sold a security in reliance on
such statement, and the price of the security was affected by the
statement.212
Environmental information is subject to the reporting standards
of the general statutory and regulatory requirements discussed
above, plus the specific reporting obligations for environmental
information in 17 C.F.R. Part 229.213 The Part 229 regulations require companies to disclose the material effects of compliance with
206. Id. §§ 77g(c), 77k.
207. Id. § 78m.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. §§ 78o, 78r.
212. Id.
213. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c) (2020). These regulations were amended in October 2020 to
replace the enumerated disclosures list adopted in 1973 with a non-exhaustive list of
disclosure topic examples. Id. The regulation now requires: (1) “(i) [r]evenue-generating
activities, products and/or services”; “(ii) [s]tatus of development efforts for new or enhanced
products, trends in market demand and competitive conditions; (iii) [r]esources material to
... business”; “(iv) ... any material portion of the business that may be subject to renegotiation”
of contracts at the election of the Government; “(v) [t]he extent to which the business is or
may be seasonal”; (2) “(i) [t]he material effects that compliance with government regulations,
including environmental regulations, may have upon the capital expenditures”; and “(ii) ... the
registrant’s human capital resources.” Id.
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environmental laws, costs of environmental litigation with potential
liability exceeding a specific threshold (formerly $100,000, but after
the SEC adopted regulatory changes in 2020, $300,000 or more),
known trends, and events or uncertainties known to management
reasonably likely to have a material effect on the registrant’s financial condition or operating results.214 The Part 229 regulation
also requires disclosure of any additional material information necessary to make those required disclosures not misleading in light
of the circumstances under which they are made.215
In the 2010 Guidance, the SEC clarified the environmental regulatory requirements regarding climate change by identifying four
areas that may trigger reporting: (1) the impact of legislation or
regulation; (2) the impact of international accords; (3) the indirect
consequences of regulation or business trends; and (4) the physical
impacts of climate change.216 The Guidance does not depart from the
materiality principle of financial disclosures, meaning that if a
company concludes that an issue is not material to its investors, it
need not be reported.217 The fourth of these areas addresses physical
risks, which differ among industries but may include risks associated with assets that are exposed to climate insecure areas, such as
places with rising sea levels or increases in natural disasters.218 For
example, a firm that relies on docking facilities may be adversely
affected by rising sea levels, or a firm that relies on grain or other
agricultural products may be adversely affected by increased severity of heat waves, droughts, and flooding.219 The disclosure of physical risks is a focus of government, private, and hybrid disclosure
initiatives,220 but it is beyond the scope of this Article.
214. Id. § 229.103 (2020). This regulation was revised in October 2020 to implement a
disclosure threshold of environmental proceedings to which the government is a party from
$100,000 to $300,000, but also allows the company to select a different threshold reasonably
designed to result in disclosure of material environmental proceedings, not to exceed $1
million or 1 percent of the company’s current assets. Id.
215. Id.
216. SEC 2010 Guidance, supra note 20, at 6295-97.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 6296-97.
219. PEG climate initiatives may increase or decrease firms’ ability to adapt to physical
climate change risks and should be accounted for when they have material effects, but any
effect PEG initiatives may have on adaptation disclosure is beyond the scope of this Article.
220. See, e.g., SEC 2010 Guidance, supra note 20, at 6296-97.
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Transition risks are the focus of this Article and are discussed in
the first three areas identified in the 2010 Guidance.221 The first and
second areas identified in the 2010 Guidance address the transition
risks arising from domestic and international public governance;
thus, the SEC follows the assumption that transition risks are essentially the same as government regulatory risks.222 As identified
by the SEC, these include risks associated with environmental laws
and regulations and information about changing public governance
requirements in the United States and abroad.223 They also include
litigation risks arising under environmental statutes, which for
climate change principally can be expected to occur under the Clean
Air Act regulations limiting or requiring the reporting of GHG
emissions.224 During the Trump administration, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) repealed or withdrew most of the
Obama-era Clean Air Act climate regulations, but the Biden administration EPA engaged in re-regulation on several topics.225
Disclosure of these risks enables investors to better understand
which firms and sectors are most vulnerable to government climate
mitigation measures, such as a carbon tax or restrictions on emissions from electric power plants or motor vehicles, and to understand which firms may be best situated to benefit from these
measures. The Marathon Petroleum Corporation disclosure discussed at the outset provides an example of a common discussion of
these types of regulatory transition risks: “Meeting the requirements of evolving environmental or other laws or regulations may
reduce our refining and marketing margin and may result in substantial capital expenditures and operating costs that could materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows.”226 There is no indication in the review of
Fortune 100 and fossil-fuel-heavy firm disclosures that these firms
221. Id. at 6295-96.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See generally Massachusetts v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
225. See COLUM. L. SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., CLIMATE REREGULATION IN
A BIDEN ADMINISTRATION 1-4, 17-20, 41-44, 46-49 (2020) (identifying potential Biden administration regulatory initiatives regarding climate change); ENV’T L. INST., supra note 116, at 2830 (identifying potential Biden administration regulatory initiatives regarding climate
change).
226. Marathon Petroleum Corp., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 49, at 32.
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fail to recognize the existence of regulatory transition risks, although the disclosures are often general and formulaic.227
The third area identified in the 2010 Guidance addresses the
indirect consequences of regulation or business trends, and this is
where the 2010 Guidance misses the opportunity to recognize and
account for PEG climate transition risks.228 The Guidance identifies
several specific types of “[i]ndirect [c]onsequences of [r]egulation or
[b]usiness [t]rends” and notes that “[l]egal, technological, political
and scientific developments regarding climate change may create
new opportunities or risks for registrants. These developments may
create demand for new products or services, or decrease demand for
existing products or services.”229 The Guidance also identifies the
following examples:
• Decreased demand for goods that produce significant greenhouse gas emissions;
• Increased demand for goods that result in lower emissions
than competing products;
• Increased competition to develop innovative new products;
• Increased demand for generation and transmission of energy
from alternative energy sources; and
• Decreased demand for services related to carbon based energy
sources, such as drilling services or equipment maintenance
services.230

227. In restating the concept of climate transition risks, Citigroup provides an example of
how the drafters of securities disclosures view transition risks as essentially including regulatory and market risks, as opposed to PEG climate risks: “transition risks (risks related to
regulatory, legal, technological and market changes from a transition to a low-carbon economy).” Citigroup, Inc., 2019 Form 10-K, supra note 161, at 294. In contrast, General Electric’s
disclosure acknowledged the importance of private governance regarding climate risk, noting
the risks arising from “the adoption of climate change-related policies (such as carbon taxes,
cap and trade regimes, increased efficiency standards or incentives or mandates for particular
types of energy) at the national and sub-national levels or by private actors.” Gen. Elec. Co.,
2019 Form 10-K, supra note 152, at 51.
228. See SEC 2010 Guidance, supra note 20, at 6296.
229. Id.
230. Id. (footnote omitted).
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This discussion in the 2010 Guidance is sufficiently broad to encompass many PEG climate initiatives, and it captures some of the
effects of these initiatives. But it is too vague to perform the function of a guidance—to call attention to disclosure obligations that
the company might otherwise miss, particularly if its lawyers, accountants, and business managers were trained in the era when
government regulatory risks and business or market trends adequately captured almost all meaningful business risks. Material
financial effects that arise from PEG initiatives do not fit neatly into
the term “[i]ndirect [c]onsequences of [r]egulation or [b]usiness
[t]rends” because PEG initiatives are neither the consequence of
government regulation nor of business trends as ordinarily conceived.231 PEG climate initiatives are not government regulatory
phenomena, since they do not occur as a result of government action and often fill gaps in government action or even occur in response to efforts by government to discourage climate mitigation.
An example of gap-filling is the “We Are Still In” movement in
which corporations, cities, states, and other organizations expressed
an intent to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement even absent
participation by the U.S. government during the Trump administration.232 Another example of gap-filling is that corporate-NGO
collaborations to promote renewable power, such as REBA, and
corporate climate commitments such as those made by Google and
Facebook, have facilitated substantial growth in renewable power,
even in states that are either on the sidelines or actively hostile to
climate mitigation.233 These PEG climate initiatives create substantial risks and opportunities for electric utilities, but a utility
disclosure that only revealed national or subnational government
regulatory pressure over the last four years would not confront the
risks arising from PEG climate initiatives that might induce its
largest current or new customers to insist on renewable power.
Nor are the material effects of PEG climate initiatives the result
of business trends as ordinarily conceived.234 PEG climate initiatives
231. See id.
232. See Leonard, supra note 30, at 10559.
233. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 108, at 3-4.
234. In addition, whether PEG climate initiatives and business trends are the same, PEG
climate risks are, at a minimum, a distinctive type of business trend that deserves special
attention in the 2020 Guidance because PEG initiatives can create financial risks and
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arise from widespread social preferences (for example, support for
climate mitigation) that drive employees, retail customers, corporate customers, investors, lenders, and insurers to support GHGreducing actions, often initiated or facilitated by environmental
advocacy groups.235 Of course, these preferences ultimately have a
monetary effect on the firm and in that way are a form of or result
in a business trend. However, the market effects are often the result
of PEG climate initiatives, and the inconsistent PEG disclosures in
annual reports suggest that a simple focus on business trends can
lead firms to overlook these types of risks. For instance, employee
and investor pressure may induce a firm to adopt a procurement
policy that reduces supply chain carbon emissions. An analysis of a
good or service that only focuses on the quality of that good or
service—rather than the carbon emissions associated with its production and shipping, or the climate commitments of its buyers and
suppliers—will miss the importance of the provenance of the good
and thus miss a critical aspect of whether the good will be attractive
to the many companies that have committed to reduce the carbon
emissions from their supply chains.236 Similarly, as discussed in
Part I above, a light bulb manufacturer that is only focused on
regulatory risk and business trends might overlook the implications
of a company making and implementing an ESG or climate commitment.237 The vulnerability of Walmart’s light bulb suppliers after
its decision to make a low-cost LED light the house brand is an example.238 The rapid transition to LED bulbs, which has resulted in
the first sustained reduction in household per capita electricity use
since the Second World War and a reduction of 127 million tons of
GHG emissions per year, has substantially affected the market for
opportunities easily missed if the disclosure writer follows only a narrow view of business
trends. In other words, revisions to the 2020 Guidance and the disclosure regulatory regime
more generally are valuable whether PEG climate initiatives pose risks that are inherently
different from business trends or are an increasingly important new form of business trend.
Inherently different or not, more precision and attention to these types of climate-related
influences will foster more valuable disclosure for investors, business managers, and public
and private policymakers.
235. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 30, at 10559.
236. See CARBON TRUST, supra note 112, at 7, 11; Supply Chain, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/
en/supply-chain [https://perma.cc/S8VS-82SD].
237. See supra Part I.A.3.
238. See supra Part I.A.3.
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light bulbs in the United States and likely has had a material effect
on several light bulb suppliers.239
The 2010 Guidance thus does not address the core insight that is
critical to understanding and disclosing the material transition
risks arising from PEG climate initiatives: the cause of the changes
in demand discussed in the examples identified in the 2010 Guidance arise not only from standard supply and demand effects, but
also from initiatives that drive changes in supply and demand for
nonmonetary reasons, such as the climate implications of a business’s operations or products. As discussed above, firms require a
legal license to operate, and the government regulatory aspects of
that legal license are accounted for in the public governance risk
areas discussed in the 2010 Guidance.240 The guidance also reflects
the fact that firms must achieve monetary success by accounting
for business trends in the form of changes in supply and demand.241
But the material effects on firms arising from PEG climate initiatives are the product of a firm’s social license to operate, not of government regulatory or standard business trends.242
Although the distinction between the effects of business trends
and the effects of PEG climate initiatives may seem small for those
not following climate mitigation initiatives closely, the distinction
may have important effects on disclosure of material issues by
public firms and on the success of PEG climate initiatives. For instance, a utility that simply uses projections of the price of renewable power from the Department of Energy’s Energy Information
Administration or from the International Energy Agency might
easily miss the importance of industry-NGO collaborations such as
REBA, or NGO naming and shaming campaigns such as the Sierra
239. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 108, at 2, 4; Davis, supra note 130, at 1098-99
(noting a decline in household electricity use following Walmart’s LED initiative); Gilligan &
Vandenbergh, supra note 130, at 101403 (calculating that Walmart’s LED light bulb initiative
reduced U.S. GHG emissions by 127 million tons per year).
240. See SEC 2010 Guidance, supra note 20.
241. See id.
242. See, e.g., Gunningham et al., supra note 79, at 308-10 (noting that firms need a social
license to operate). In September 2021, the SEC released a model information request letter
that takes an important step toward identifying the need for firms to disclose the risks and
opportunities of PEG initiatives, but the SEC stopped short of fully exploring the differences
between regulatory transition risks, traditional market risks, and risks arising from PEG initiatives. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 57.

2022]

DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE CLIMATE TRANSITION RISKS

1747

Club’s RE100, in driving corporate demands for renewable power.243
A coal company that discloses only the legal risks and business
trends arising during the Trump administration might reasonably
suggest in its securities disclosures that it was entering a period of
more favorable demand for its product, but it would have been
wrong. This is not because it would have missed the repeal of many
Obama-era regulatory requirements on coal-fired power plants, but
because it would have missed the movement by utilities and their
customers away from coal and toward natural gas and renewable
power. That movement, in turn, is the product of a complex set of
factors, including cheap natural gas and the anticipation of future
government regulation, but it is not fully understood without
accounting for the fact that roughly two-thirds of the Fortune 100
companies have made major climate commitments that are inconsistent with a carbon-intensive electric grid.244 Similarly, a
utility that failed to assess the climate commitments of its corporate
customers might fail to anticipate and disclose these customers’
efforts to reduce demand through energy efficiency.245
The importance of PEG climate initiatives extends beyond disclosures in carbon-intensive sectors such as coal, petroleum refining,
and electric utilities. For instance, as discussed above, if a firm that
sells products to major retailers only focuses on conventional regulatory risks or business trends, then it might easily overlook the
effects of Walmart’s Project Gigaton, in which Walmart is working
with the Environmental Defense Fund, World Wildlife Fund, and
other advocacy groups to commit to reduce its GHG emissions from
its supply chain by a billion tons by 2030.246 A supplier to Walmart
may move from a competitive advantage based on price to a competitive disadvantage based on the carbon footprint of its products
if it fails to assess the social license pressure on Walmart and

243. See, e.g., Our Vision, RENEWABLE ENERGY BUYER’S ALL., https://rebuyers.org/about/
vision/ [https://perma.cc/Y9ZW-ELKM].
244. See DAVID GARDINER & ASSOCS., supra note 188, at 5, 7 (noting the climate commitments of two-thirds of the Fortune 100 and the implications for electric utilities).
245. For an example of a utility that has identified reduced demand via energy efficiency
as a material threat, see Vandenbergh et al., supra note 108, at 23-24 (discussing the disclosures by the Tennessee Valley Authority, which was not a part of the empirical analysis
for this Article).
246. See supra Part II.A; PROJECT GIGATON, supra note 36.
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Walmart’s subsequent supply chain contracting initiative. Supply
chain initiatives, in which firms make and enforce climate commitments that are applicable to the entire value chain, are not unique
to Walmart. They are growing rapidly, and these initiatives often
involve combinations of publicly traded firms, dark green advocacy
groups, and bright green advocacy groups, such as CDP, that play
a data disclosure and expertise role rather than a direct advocacy
role.247 In this way, PEG climate initiatives can create important
transition risks and opportunities for a firm that are distinct from
pure regulatory or market risks.
B. Commodities Futures Trading Commission
In response to concerns about the lack of transparency regarding
financial climate risks, in 2020, the CFTC issued a report titled,
“Managing Climate Risk in the U.S. Financial System.”248 The report represents an important recognition of climate risks by the
CFTC, and it recommended strengthening disclosure requirements
for corporate climate risks by expanding the meaning of “material”
to include long-term risks and including risks to companies posed by
future policies.249 As to disclosure of PEG climate transition risks,
however, the report did not identify these initiatives as a specific
risk to companies’ bottom lines.250 The report cited a 2018 study by
the Government Accountability Office that examined climate risk
disclosures.251 The study found that some companies use boilerplate
language disclosing “reduced demand for our products” and note
that they are “committed to complying with all Greenhouse Gas ...
247. See CARBON TRUST, supra note 112, at 3, 5; supra Part I.A.
248. CFTC Report, supra note 22, at 127-28.
249. Id. For context on the CFTC report from an environmental perspective, see Mindy
Lubber, We Need a Federal Climate Risk System, ENV’T F., Nov./Dec. 2020, at 25 (noting comments of Mindy Lubber, Ceres CEO and member of the CFTC subcommittee that drafted the
CFTC Report, regarding the need for CFTC, SEC, and the Federal Reserve to expand climate
disclosures). According to Robert Litterman, chair of the panel that produced the report,
“[t]his is the first time a government entity has looked at the impacts of climate change on
financial markets in the U.S. ... Rather than saying, ‘What’s the science?’ this is saying,
‘What’s the financial risk?’” Coral Davenport & Jeanna Smialek, Federal Report Warns of
Financial Havoc from Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/09/08/climate/climate-change-financial-markets.html [https://perma.cc/2QZB-TMAJ].
250. See generally CFTC Report, supra note 22.
251. Id. at 91-92.
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emissions mandates,” and others disclose the costs of complying
with regulations and disclose the specific metrics of their emissions.252 Neither the report nor the study called attention to the lack
of disclosures of material PEG climate transition risks.253
C. Federal Reserve
In November 2020, the Federal Reserve signaled its concern
about the financial impacts of climate change for the first time. In
the November 2020 quarterly report, the Federal Reserve provided
an example of the types of risks that may arise:
Some residential and commercial properties will be subject to
acute hazards such as storm surges associated with rising sea
levels and more intense and frequent hurricanes. Continued
productive use of these properties would require investment and
adaptation. As inundations or storm surges become more
frequent, the expected value of exposed real estate may decrease, which may in turn pose risks to real estate loans,
mortgage-backed securities, the holders of these loans and
securities, and the profitability of nonfinancial firms using such
properties.254

The Federal Reserve noted that these types of developments could
produce abrupt price shifts with adverse effects on the economy.255
To address these types of risks, the report notes:
Continued research into the interconnections between the
climate, the economy, and the financial sector could strengthen knowledge of transmission, clarify linkages and exposures,
and facilitate more efficient pricing of risk. Outside the financial system, efforts to mitigate or adapt to the physical effects
of climate change through technological advances and policy
changes could also reduce climate risks in the long run.256

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
See generally id.
Federal Reserve Report, supra note 23, at 59.
Id.
Id.
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These statements represent major progress in the thinking and
public discussion about climate risks by one of the most influential
actors in the financial system.
As to PEG climate transition risks, though, note the underlying
assumption: the question is whether an influence on the financial
system is “[o]utside the financial system” or presumably “inside the
financial system,” and the factors that are outside the financial
system are “technological advances” and “policy changes.”257 Where
does the social license to operate, and, as to climate change, where
do PEG climate transition risks fit in this analytical framework?
There is little signal in the report that the Federal Reserve views
PEG climate initiatives as a form of “policy.”258 It certainly does not
explicitly include PEG climate initiatives in what it discusses as
factors that are inside the economy, nor does it explicitly call out the
importance of “[o]utside” influences such as private initiatives, even
if they involve major pressure on investors, lenders, insurers, and
corporations in various sectors that arise from private organizations
seeking to achieve climate change mitigation rather than from government regulators.259
D. Public-Private Hybrid and Private Disclosure Regimes
In addition to disclosures under U.S. securities laws, firms face
pressure to make more in-depth disclosures under several publicprivate hybrid and private initiatives that track data related to
climate change and other environmental issues. Among the most
widely followed are the climate disclosures identified by the TCFD
and SASB.260 The TCFD is a hybrid, with governmental and private
Id.
See id.
See id.
For a recent advocacy group report, see generally VEENA RAMANI, CERES, ADDRESSING
CLIMATE AS A SYSTEMIC RISK (2020) https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/reports/202006/Financial%20Regulators%20FULL%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE6C-BJE6] (providing fifty recommendations for improved climate risk disclosure). The TCFD and SASB disclosure regimes are also important because they demonstrate that many firms already have
the information necessary to make climate disclosures that include a broad accounting for climate transition risks, and many are prepared to do so without a great deal of additional cost
or coercion. This suggests that little downside exists to more explicit SEC securities disclosure
guidance. The CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) and the Science Based Targets
257.
258.
259.
260.
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sector participants, whereas SASB is comprised of for-profit and
nonprofit private organizations, although it has included substantial
governmental participation.261
The TCFD was established in 2015 by the Financial Stability
Board (FSB), which the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors asked to review how the financial sector should account
for climate-related issues.262 The FSB is an international body consisting of sixty-eight members, including ministries of finance and
central banks from twenty-four countries and the European Union,
and international supervisory and regulatory authorities, including
the IMF and the World Bank.263 The FSB has made recommendations about the global financial system, and the TCFD, which includes public- and private-sector representatives, such as Unilever,
the Singapore Exchange, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China,264 has developed recommendations for climate-related
disclosures with the goal of enabling stakeholders to better understand the financial system’s exposure to climate-related risks.265
The TCFD, like the SEC, has categorized climate risks as arising
from transition risks and physical risks.266 The TCFD takes a broader approach to transition risks than the SEC 2010 Guidance, however, by defining transition risks to include not only policy and legal
risks, technology risk, and market risk, but also reputation risk.267
PEG climate transition risks are implicitly accounted for in market
initiative (SBTi) require disclosures of emissions but not disclosures of physical or transition
risks. See CARBON TRUST, supra note 112, at 11; About Us, supra note 105.
261. See generally Task Force Members, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES,https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/members/ [https://perma.cc/82Q9-66QM]; Standards Board
Members, SASB, https://www.sasb.org/about/governance/standards-board/ [https://perma.cc/
DKG9-92T9].
262. Nathan Reiff, Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/what-is-the-tcfd-task-force-on-climaterelated-financial-disclosures-4771379 [https://perma.cc/B4R7-H6RK].
263. See generally Members of the Financial Stability Board, FIN. STABILITY BD., https://
www.fsb.org/about/organisation-and-governance/members-of-the-financial-stability-board/
[https://perma.cc/H6JZ-D8EX] (listing members as of September 23, 2021).
264. See Task Force Members, supra note 261.
265. The TCFD’s goal is to promote more informed investment, credit, and insurance underwriting decisions. See generally TCFD, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES: OVERVIEW (2021) [hereinafter TCFD Overview], https://assets.bbhub.io/company/
sites/60/2021/10/TCFD_Booklet_FNL_Digital_March-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/82Q9-66QM].
266. See generally id.
267. TCFD 2017 Report, supra note 24, at 5-6.
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and reputation risks, including shifts in supply and demand and
customer perceptions of an organization’s contribution to the transition to a lower-carbon economy.268
Although the TCFD disclosure regime includes a broader approach to transition risks than the 2010 SEC Guidance, it takes a
narrow view of how PEG climate initiatives pose risks to companies’
financial health.269 The TCFD identifies the transition risks of
moving towards a green economy and focuses on two types of risks:
(1) market risks, such as changing customer behavior, unexpected
cost shifts, and re-pricing of assets; and (2) reputation risks, such as
stigmatization of certain sectors and stakeholder concern.270 By
identifying reputation risks and the importance of stigma, the
TCFD more explicitly identifies the types of transition risks created
by PEG climate initiatives than the SEC and other federal entities,
but this language is vague and does not encompass risks arising
from several other types of PEG climate initiatives, such as divestment campaigns, renewable power campaigns, and supply chain
contracting requirements.271 These types of initiatives can have
material effects on companies but are not forms of reputation risks;
do not necessarily involve stigmatization; and are not highlighted
to the same extent as risks posed by laws, regulations, and the physical effects of climate change. The TCFD recommendations thus
represent an improvement but still fall into the same trap as the
SEC guidance: identifying public governance and physical effects of
climate change as the principal risks of climate change and calling

268. Id.
269. Melissa Scanlan has noted that the European Commission has finessed this issue by
interpreting the TCFD recommendations broadly. See Scanlan, supra note 12, at 31-32. She
observes that the European Commission’s interpretation of the European Union’s NonFinancial Disclosure Directive requires companies not only to disclose material impacts climate change may have on the company, but also the material impacts the company may have
on climate change. Id. (quoting Eur. Comm’n Guidelines, at 7-8; and then citing TCFD 2017
Report, at ii, 5-6). As Scanlan points out, unlike the discussion and examples provided by the
SEC and TCFD, examples provided in the EU Guidelines include disclosure of the company’s
direct GHG emissions and the recommendation to “[d]escribe any climate-related targets the
company has set as part of its policies, especially any GHG emissions targets, and how company targets relate to national and international targets and to the Paris Agreement in particular.” Id. at 34 (quoting Eur. Comm’n Guidelines, at 14) (alteration in original).
270. See TCFD Overview, supra note 265, at 12.
271. See id.
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only limited attention to the transition risks posed by PEG climate
initiatives.
The TCFD recommends that companies “[d]isclose the actual and
potential impacts of climate-related risks and opportunities on the
organization’s businesses, strategy, and financial planning.”272 The
guidance for these disclosures states that organizations should
consider discussing: “where they believe their strategies may be
affected by climate-related risks and opportunities; how their
strategies might change to address such potential risks and opportunities; and the climate-related scenarios and associated time
horizon(s) considered.”273 Again, the language is broad enough to
include risks that may occur from climate-related PEG initiatives
that affect the company, but it does not include examples of PEG
initiatives. The transition risks identified are: policy and legal
(“pricing of GHG emissions[,] [e]nhanced emissions-reporting obligations[,]” regulation of products and services), technology
(“[s]ubstitution of existing products and services[,] ... [u]nsuccessful
investment in new technologies[,]” transition costs), market
(“[c]hanging customer behavior[,] [u]ncertainty in market signals[,]
[i]ncreased cost of raw materials”), and reputation (“[s]hifts in
consumer preferences[,] [s]tigmatization of sector, [i]ncreased stakeholder concern or negative stakeholder feedback”).274 The guidance
also does not identify PEG climate initiatives as a likely source of
the risks. For example, the TCFD report identifies decreased demand for goods or services and reduction in capital availability as
climate-related potential financial impacts but does not note that
these impacts are often the result of a PEG initiative such as a divestment, naming and shaming, supply chain contracting, or other
PEG climate campaigns.275
Along with TCFD, SASB plays a leading role in highlighting the
importance of identifying and disclosing climate risks. SASB is an
272. TCFD 2017 Report, supra note 24, at 21.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 10. Sarah Light and Eric Orts have noted that public and private governance
deploy similar regulatory instruments or tools. Light & Orts, supra note 27, at 2-3. The fact
that many firms do not disclose PEG climate transition risks when similarly situated firms
do suggests that conceptual barriers may be limiting the assessment and disclosure of private
governance-based risks.
275. See TCFD 2017 Report, supra note 24, at 10.
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independent standards board that operates through sector-based
committees, with a board composed of representatives from university professors, accountants, attorneys, and corporate managers.276
SASB identifies sustainability issues that are likely to affect the financial condition of companies and recommends standards based on
the company and industry.277 The SASB industry-specific standards
provide examples of the expected types of assessment and disclosure, such as the SASB discussion of disclosures for the petroleum
refining sector, while including broad language identifying areas for
disclosure including “risk to reputation due to entity’s stance and
actions related to the legal and regulatory environment ... and risk
of misalignment with the expectations of customers, investors, and
other stakeholders.”278 Although this language does not expressly
identify PEG climate initiatives, it provides perhaps the best identification of drivers of PEG climate initiatives, which certainly draw
on and stimulate the climate-related expectations of customers,
investors, and other stakeholders.279 The standards also recommend
disclosure of long-term and short-term business strategies for emissions reduction and “how price and demand for coal and/or climate
regulation influence the capital expenditure strategy for exploration, acquisition, and development of assets.”280 In short, the
standards obliquely signal the importance of PEG climate initiatives, but they do not compel coal companies to discuss the risks
that divestment campaigns and other initiatives will reduce the
availability of funds for coal-related projects.

276. See Standards Board Members, supra note 261.
277. See generally SASB Materiality Map, SASB, https://materiality.sasb.org/ [https://
perma.cc/FJW4-3YG9].
278. SASB, OIL & GAS—EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION: SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING
STANDARD STANDARDS 45-46 (2018), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Oil_
Gas_Exploration_Production_Standard_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6U3-V65F].
279. SASB’s disclosure recommendations are largely focused on sustainability disclosure
topics. For example, its disclosure standards for coal operations includes nine topics: GHG
emissions, water management, waste management, biodiversity impacts, rights of indigenous
peoples, community relations, labor relations, workforce health and safety, and reserves valuation and capital expenditures. SASB, COAL OPERATIONS: SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING
STANDARD, at 6-7 (2018), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Coal_Operations_
Standard_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G8Y-NFV6].
280. Id.
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E. Other Disclosure Regimes
Other governmental entities and organizations also focus on
climate risks, often without paying attention to the risks posed by
PEG climate initiatives. For instance, in October 2020, the Bank of
England announced new disclosure rules to help markets price in
the risks of climate change, citing the need for better information for
investors “and for asset managers to make more informed decisions.”281 These disclosures generally track the TCFD recommendations, addressing the two primary sources of risk identified by many
disclosure regimes: (1) the physical effects of climate change; and
(2) the impact of changes associated with the transition to a carbonneutral economy.282 The Bank’s requirements are more granular
than the TCFD’s recommendations, but they also do not adequately
call attention to the risks posed by PEG climate initiatives.283
Similarly, the World Economic Forum and the big four accounting firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers) have unveiled a framework for environmental, social,
and governance disclosures, citing the need for “a more sustainable
relationship with our planet.”284 The World Economic Forum’s report
recognizes the growing pressure of standard-setting initiatives and
investor interests on companies but does not fully address the financial risks posed by PEG climate initiatives.285 The report notes
the importance of European Commission initiatives, new SEC
disclosure regulations, and initiatives from the CDP, SASB, and
281. Huw Jones, Bank of England Says Company Disclosures on Climate Risks Will Be
Mandatory, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2020, 6:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-boe-markets/bank-of-england-says-company-disclosures-on-climate-risks-will-bemandatory-idUSKBN2711DZ [https://perma.cc/8WZE-7X2Y].
282. See BANK OF ENG., THE BANK OF ENGLAND’S CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
4-5, 9 (2020), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/annual-report/2020/climaterelated-financial-disclosure-report-2019-20.pdf?la=en&hash=5DA959C54540287A2E90
C823807E089055E6721B [https://perma.cc/N9PU-PRCU].
283. See generally id.
284. Avery Ellfeldt, Major Accounting Firms Urge Companies to Disclose Risks, E&E NEWS
(Sept. 23, 2020, 6:48 AM), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063714423 [https://perma.cc/9N
MB-4MKZ].
285. See WORLD ECON. F., MEASURING STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM: TOWARDS COMMON
METRICS AND CONSISTENT REPORTING OF SUSTAINABLE VALUE CREATION 41 (2020), http://
www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_IBC_Measuring_Stakeholder_Capitalism_Report_2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5W25-7M6K].
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other international organizations,286 but it does not address the financial effects of meeting the demands of PEG climate initiatives.287
Along these lines, a recent report from Merrill noted the financial
incentives for companies to disclose physical and transition risks,288
but it also did not focus on the financial risks posed by PEG climate
initiatives.289
Securities disclosure in Australia follows similar patterns. A
report from the University of Melbourne Law School examined Australian public companies’ financial disclosures under the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission’s (ASIC) regulations regarding climate risks.290 The report notes that Australian companies
are more likely to disclose risks associated with “changing energy
markets, technology advances and changing energy policy to be of
material consequence to their businesses, and are less likely to
identify and disclose physical climate-related risks.”291
The report found that shareholders and investors seek to influence the companies in which they invest by pressuring them to
make emissions reductions, to adopt climate change mitigation
goals, and to include those goals and their plans to achieve them
in public disclosures.292 The report also notes that civil society
groups, often in partnership with shareholders or investors, are
pressuring ASIC to enforce disclosure obligations as they relate to
climate risks.293 The report thus recognizes a private-sector push to
encourage disclosure of public governance and physical climate
risks,294 but it does not grapple with the argument that companies

286. See id.
287. See generally id.
288. See Christopher Hyzy, Jackie VanderBrug & Jonathan Kozy, The Great Shift: Shareholder to Stakeholder Capitalism, MERRILL 3, 5-8 (Sept. 2020), https://perma.cc/6JQD-CGNL.
289. See generally id.
290. See JACQUELINE PEEL, HARI OSOFSKY, BRETT MCDONNELL, HARI M. OSOFSKY, ANITA
FOERSTER & REBEKKAH MARKEY-TOWLER, CORPORATE ENERGY TRANSITION: LEGAL TOOLS FOR
SHIFTING COMPANIES TOWARDS CLEAN ENERGY PRACTICES 13 (Sept. 2020), https://law.uni
melb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/3500460/Corporate-Energy-Transition-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5Y6K-LBGR].
291. Id. at 22.
292. See id. at 10.
293. See id.
294. See id. at 46-47.
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should also be disclosing their financial risks associated with PEG
climate initiatives.295
III. NEXT STEPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Part III proposes responses that can increase the accuracy and
completeness of the disclosure of transition risks posed by PEG
climate initiatives. These responses include changes to: (1) the
SEC’s 2010 Guidance; (2) the CFTC and other government statements on climate disclosure; and (3) the hybrid disclosure regimes.
These proposals do not require major departures from core securities disclosure principles, but all of them could enhance the
effects of private initiatives on firm financial disclosures and climate
change mitigation. This Part also suggests a longer-term, more
fundamental shift in the attention given to private governance in
the training of lawyers, accountants, business managers, and policymakers. In the long run, more complete and uniform disclosures
not only could improve the information available to investors, but
also could enhance the ability of PEG climate initiatives and other
private governance activities to fill gaps in government leadership
on climate change and other major social issues.
A. Updating Public and Hybrid Disclosure Regimes
1. Federal Regulatory Regime
The Biden administration is playing a large role in restructuring
climate risk disclosure. Prior to his inauguration, the President’s
transition team identified climate risk as a powerful policy tool that
could help the administration’s climate agenda without relying on
Congress to legislate.296 Through an executive order and agency
statements, the administration then pursued increased climate financial disclosure.297
295. See generally id.
296. Stephen Lacey, The New President’s Powerful Tool: Climate Risk Disclosure, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-new-presidentspowerful-tool-climate-risk-disclosure [https://perma.cc/HH3C-7W6B].
297. See Exec. Order No. 14,030, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,967 (May 20, 2021); see, e.g., SEC Response to Climate and ESG Risks and Opportunities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 26,
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The concepts discussed in this Article could inform the SEC,
CFTC, and other federal regulatory authorities as they focus on
disclosure of climate transition risks.298 Two SEC commissioners
have stated that they believe the agency should do more regarding
climate change disclosure, and the Biden economic team indicated
that climate change is at the top of its agenda.299 Although legislation or regulations requiring disclosure of nonmaterial climate
risks will be a heavy lift for the new SEC,300 issuance of updated
guidances and enforcement policies that call out the need to disclose material transition risks arising from PEG climate initiatives
is well within the SEC’s existing statutory and regulatory authority.301
Similarly, the CFTC would be well within its authority to assess
and update existing statements regarding climate change to address
explicitly the transition risks arising from PEG climate initiatives.302 In addition to identifying climate change as a potential danger to financial stability,303 the Federal Reserve has announced that
it has joined the international Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System.304 These are both significant steps toward seriously addressing the financial risks of
climate change. Janet Yellen, the Biden administration Secretary
of the Treasury, also has signaled that she places a high priority on

2021), https://www.sec.gov/sec-response-climate-and-esg-risks-and-opportunities [https://
perma.cc/MB72-W9XT].
298. See generally supra Parts I-II.
299. See Zachary Warmbrodt & Debra Kahn, How Biden Can Fight Climate Change
Without Congress, POLITICO (Nov. 24, 2020, 12:28 PM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/
the-long-game/2020/11/24/how-biden-fight-climate-change-congress-490983 [https://perma.cc/
R8GV-T2NP].
300. See, e.g., DAVID GARDINER & ASSOCIATES, supra note 115, at 3-4.
301. See, e.g., supra notes 205-19 and accompanying text.
302. See generally Commodity Exchange Act & Regulations, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/CommodityExchangeAct/index.htm [https://
perma.cc/6R54-V855]; Energy & Environmental Markets Advisory Committee, COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/About/AdvisoryCommittees/EEMAC [https://
perma.cc/C5UU-DJM3].
303. See BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 23, at 58.
304. Press Release, Bd. Governors Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board Announces It
Has Formally Joined the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the
Financial System, or NGFS, as a Member (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20201215a.htm [https://perma.cc/C7LK-FSFK].
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climate change disclosure and mitigation.305 She leads the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, which includes the leaders of the SEC,
Federal Reserve, and other bank regulators.306
In ramping up the climate disclosure requirements, these federal
actors would benefit from a broader conception of governance and
a more complete understanding of the role that PEG climate initiatives play with respect to the financial performance of firms and
the ability of governments and others to reduce the risk of climate
change.
2. Hybrid Disclosure Regimes
The TCFD and SASB are already a step ahead of the federal
agencies in recognizing the material risks posed by PEG climate
initiatives.307 They could improve firm disclosure, however, by updating their existing standards to explicitly reference the transition
risks of PEG climate initiatives. They also could provide specific
examples and guidance to aid in the development of corporate
climate disclosures. The momentum behind increased climate transition risk disclosures, as demonstrated by recent TCFD and SASB
announcements,308 suggests that an increased focus on the disclosure of the risks of PEG climate initiatives is feasible and can be
done quickly.
B. Updating the Mental Models of Lawyers, Accountants,
Business Managers, and Policymakers
The recommendations for the federal and hybrid regulatory regimes are viable near-term actions, but a more fundamental change
is also warranted. It is unlikely just as a matter of chance that the
SEC disclosures of the Fortune 100 vary greatly in their disclosure
of PEG climate risks, and that the SEC, CFTC, TCFD, SASB, and
other securities disclosure regimes all provide only minimal focus on
305. See Victoria Guida, Janet Yellen: Climate Change Poses “Existential Threat” to Financial Markets, POLITICO (Mar. 31, 2021, 6:19 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/
03/31/yellen-climate-change-fsoc-478769 [https://perma.cc/BF2P-W84R].
306. Id.
307. See supra Part II.D.
308. See supra Part II.D.
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PEG climate initiatives. These initiatives not only are relatively
recent phenomena, emerging largely in the last decade,309 but they
also challenge the mental model that lawyers, accountants, business
managers, and policymakers use to frame the financial challenges
that social problems and responses pose to firms.310
When confronting a major social problem, the question often
asked as to securities disclosure is how the problem and responses
to the problem will affect the firm’s financial condition.311 As to the
responses to the problem, the question often asked is, “[w]hat can
government do?”312 The result of framing the questions in this way
is that the responses to problems such as climate change are viewed
as posing physical risks and government regulatory risks.313 Once
those have been assessed and disclosed, the discloser’s job is done.314
This Article demonstrates that this framing is no longer adequate. PEG climate initiatives often pose material transition risks
to firms, even though they are not a form of governmental regulation,315 but disclosure of PEG climate risks is uneven at best.316
Lawyers, accountants, business managers, and policymakers need
a broader mental model that can accommodate the role of private
governance as well as public governance. The literature across multiple disciplines has demonstrated the growth of private governance
on many topics—and the emergence of universal owners suggests
that this will continue—but the literature on private governance
risk is only beginning to seep into the training of the securities
disclosure gatekeepers.317 One answer is to expand curricula and
textbooks to enable training of lawyers, accountants, business
managers, and policymakers about the theory, types, and effects of
309. See Vandenbergh, supra note 27, at 140-41.
310. See, e.g., id. at 182-83.
311. See, e.g., VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 38, at 119, 138; PEEL ET AL., supra
note 290, at 28.
312. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 38, at 15.
313. See supra Introduction.
314. See supra Introduction.
315. See supra Part I.A.
316. See supra Part I.B.2.
317. For a discussion of the implications of universal owner theory for disclosure of ESG
risks, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and
Systematic Risk, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 602, 636-41; Madison Condon, Externalities and
the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24-26 (2020).
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private governance.318 In addition, practicing lawyers and accountants could be brought up to speed quickly through the addition of
private governance components to continuing education programs.319
Mental models take years and, in some cases, generations to update;320 but the demonstration of visible, quantifiable effects on financial performance and climate change mitigation may accelerate
the process.
In addition, although this Article has focused on the role of private governance in climate mitigation, private governance initiatives have played an important role in many other areas that may
affect securities disclosure. For decades, private governance has affected corporate risks and opportunities with respect to food safety,
organic products, and fair trade.321 More recently, however, private
governance initiatives have begun to play an important role in campaign finance, affecting (1) the contributions that candidates agree
to accept;322 (2) the disclosure of campaign contributions by firms;323
and (3) state voting laws.324 Private governance initiatives also have
addressed content concerns in traditional and new media,325 as well
318. See, e.g., Scott Schang, Developing a Sustainability Law Course, ENV’T F. Nov./Dec.
2020, at 48-49 (discussing the absence of training on private environmental governance for
lawyers); Michael P. Vandenbergh, David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair of Law, Vanderbilt Law School, The Emerging Environmental Law Curriculum Conference: The Role of
Private Environmental Governance in the Modern Environmental Law Curriculum (June 21,
2019) (discussing ways to include PEG in environmental law school classes).
319. See, e.g., Events, ENV’T L. INST., https://www.eli.org/private-environmental-governance/
events [https://perma.cc/T3LS-H3WZ] (listing webinars and conferences regarding private
environmental governance).
320. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
321. See Vandenbergh, supra note 27, at 148-51. See generally Van Loo, supra note 58 (examining the role that corporations play in enforcing legal requirements in the technology,
banking, oil, and pharmaceuticals industries).
322. See generally Ganesh Sitaraman, Essay, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 755 (2014).
323. See generally Haan, supra note 27.
324. See, e.g., Marianna Sotomayor & Todd C. Frankel, Republicans Ramp up Attacks on
Corporations over Georgia Voting Law, Threaten “Consequences,” WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2021,
7:59 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/georgia-voting-mlb-trump-mcconnell/2021/
04/05/5aa65090-9622-11eb-962b-78c1d8228819_story.html [https://perma.cc/Z3NA-EWF7].
325. See, e.g., Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1658-62 (2018) (examining the role of new
media platforms regarding the content of media coverage); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Essay,
Social Checks and Balances: A Private Fairness Doctrine, 73 VAND. L. REV. 811, 812-14 (2020)
(arguing for a private standard to increase the completeness and accuracy of the information
conveyed via traditional and new media); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167
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as filled gaps in retail consumer protection.326 Similarly, the lack
of government leadership during the COVID-19 pandemic induced
firms to play the traditional government role of setting public
health standards.327 In each of these areas, more informed investor
decision-making and better social responses will arise if the securities disclosure regime and the mental models of its key gatekeepers reflect the importance of both private governance and public
governance.328
CONCLUSION
Global pressure for corporate climate disclosure by government,
private, and hybrid regulatory regimes has been growing for the
last decade.329 The SEC is revisiting its approach to climate change
financial disclosure,330 and the key question is what should be disclosed.
Requiring climate-related disclosure that does not meet a traditional financial materiality threshold is a valuable public welfare
measure given the immediate, severe, and long-lasting threat of climate change.331 Any effort to expand government disclosure requirements will increase political and academic resistance, however,
by adding market efficiency adherents to the climate skeptics who
already oppose climate-related disclosures.332 The attempts to increase climate disclosures—even if they are not material—are

U. PA. L. REV. 665, 666-67, 672, 674-80 (2019) (discussing performance of governmental
functions by internet companies).
326. See Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REGUL. 547, 551-53,
569-71 (2016) (arguing that private sector online reputation websites are filling informational
and enforcement gaps left by courts and administrative agencies in the context of consumer
disputes).
327. See, e.g., Bill Saporito, Meet the New C.D.C. Director: Walmart, N.Y. TIMES (July
24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/opinion/walmart-coronavirus-masks.html
[https://perma.cc/8PER-7QWX] (arguing that because of their mask policies, “the nation’s
retailers have become the first line of defense against the pandemic”).
328. See Van Loo, supra note 58, at 522.
329. See supra Part II.
330. See Warmbrodt & Kahn, supra note 299.
331. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 38, at ix-xi.

2022]

DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE CLIMATE TRANSITION RISKS

1763

worthy efforts, but the opportunity cost of pursuing them to the exclusion of other climate disclosure requirements is high.333
This Article argues for changes to SEC and other disclosure regimes that can drive additional private-sector climate mitigation but
are less likely to generate resistance. Thus, these changes can be
adopted quickly while battles wage over the role of materiality in
financial disclosure. The focus of the growing global pressure has
been on greater disclosure of two types of climate risks: physical
risks and transition risks.334 The theoretical and empirical analysis
in this Article demonstrates that transition risks include not just
the risks arising from future government laws, policies, and programs nor just the risks arising from shifts in markets. Rather,
transition risks also include the risks arising from the translation
of widespread preferences for decarbonization into market forces
through private climate governance.
The empirical analysis presented in this Article also demonstrates variable disclosure of these risks, suggesting that these
risks are important enough for many publicly traded firms to disclose, yet are so easy to overlook that many similarly situated firms
do not disclose them. This Article also argues for updating the
mental models that steer the training and decision-making of lawyers, accountants, business managers, and policymakers. It suggests that the effects of private climate initiatives can be better
understood, identified, and disclosed if they are conceptualized as
a discrete source of transition risk. Guidance documents, enforcement policies, and regulations that require firms to account for
private climate initiatives do not mandate that the SEC require
disclosure of nonmaterial risks. Rather, these guidance documents,
enforcement policies, and regulations force firms to not overlook
risks that may be material but nevertheless fall outside the conceptual frameworks and training of lawyers, accountants, business
managers, and policymakers.
This change in disclosure will have two salutary effects: (1) more
accurate and complete financial disclosures; and (2) acceleration
of efforts to decarbonize the economy. The swinging pendulum of
333. See generally Jonathan M. Gilligan & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for
Political Feasibility in Climate Instrument Choice, 32 VA. ENV’T L.J. 1 (2014).
334. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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White House support for climate mitigation and the deep divisions
in Congress and the Supreme Court will limit the possibility of
adopting and implementing major federal climate legislation and
regulations.335 Leveraging private sector action on climate change
thus will continue to be an important piece of the climate mitigation effort.
Disclosure of the risks of private climate initiatives not only can
yield more informed financial decision-making, but also can promote the use of private initiatives to reduce GHG emissions. These
GHG emissions are critical if major, near-term reductions are
needed to maintain some chance of achieving the 2ºC goal of the
Paris Agreement,336 much less the 1.5ºC aspiration.337 In addition,
private sector action, which is driven by factors including employee,
customer, investor, and lender norms, may be more durable than
public sector regulatory actions. In the long run, the process of accounting for and disclosing private governance risks should extend
well beyond climate change to other regulatory areas, including
campaign finance, data privacy, health, worker safety, and others.

335. See, e.g., Warmbrodt & Kahn, supra note 299.
336. Paris Agreement, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art.
2(1)(a), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104, U.N.T.C. ch. XXVII(7.d), https://unfccc.int/sites/
default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/V73Z-E34B].
337. Id.

